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 This investment advisory service is supported by some of the most adequate valuation 
frameworks discussed throughout the literature review, whose purpose is to break down the 
best quantitative assessment of the financial institutions’ equity and come up with a final price 
target. Thereby, an insightful analysis is provided, in which the source of research is a listed 
financial institution in PSI20 index – Banco Espírito Santo, the largest capitalised bank in 
Portugal. 
 At the end of this dissertation, all the valuation metrics under analysis and the rational 
will be closely compared to Caixa Banco de Investimento’s banking report published on  
December 13 2011, an up-to-date sector report of the Portuguese banks challenges.  
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 This dissertation is an ongoing process of hard work, whose success depends upon the 
people I have been relying on to obtain privileged information of the company under my 
coverage, even though it has not been enough to overcome the problem of information scarcity.  
 When facing the moments of incapacity to reach decisive values that could only be 
ascertained by the interns of the company, I would like to express my gratitude to Professor José 
Tudela Martins for his acceptance of other alternatives to fill the gap of no access to the original 
idea. 
 Also, the debates between me and Andreia Dias, a master student and close friend who 
has been carrying out an equity research of a non-financial institution company named Energias 
de Portugal, revealed to be critical to swing around some of the secretive areas, which have been 
evolving as the working process becomes tougher and tougher.  
 I would gladly express my gratitude to CaixaBI analyst André Rodrigues for sending his 
banking report and showing availability to discuss the most recent hot topics. 
Last but not the least, I would recall all the family members who are my right hand and 
have been telling me words of hope, insofar the financial sector has been increasingly volatile, 
meaning that information gets easily outdated. 
 
 




As of March 30 2012, BES was the largest domestic financial institution listed in PSI20 
index with a market capitalization of about € 2 bn, being placed in 4th by weight. The successful 
profile of BES group translates into the 2nd Portuguese private bank by total assets of € 80,2 bn 
with an average local market share of 19.3% in FY2011 and around 2.2 mn customers over the 
world (BES, Factsheet, 2012). 
The bank operates in different segments such as Private Banking, Retail Banking, 
Corporate and Institutional Clients, Asset Management, Investment Banking and International 
Commercial Banking. 
As a motivation to seek for long term profitability, BES Group has been showing a special 
concern on international expansion for what they call the strategic triangle: Angola, Brazil and 
Spain. The rationale behind it goes alongside with the need to augment the dynamics in 
emerging markets that reveal cultural and economic linkage with Portugal. 
As for domestic businesses, the strategic moves go hand in hand not only with the need 
of intensifying customer funds, but also taking advantage of cross-selling insurance to foster 
banking income growth. The local core competences are corporate banking, trade finance, 
private banking and investment banking. 
This equity research is concentrated on valuing BES by applying a bunch of valuation 
models that will signal buy or sell recommendations for the financial institutions in the form of 
price targets issued by the analyst.  
BES group was evaluated by four different approaches: Dupont analysis, Excess return 
model – Damodaran, Equity free cash flow and finally relative valuation. The purpose of this 
research was to look at the bank’s business and understand how each geographical area was 
creating value for its stakeholders. Hereby, I decided to split up the business into two different 
core areas: domestic and international. 
Therefore, the final consideration is to stick to excess return model to determine the fair 
value of BES shares. It is the only model that punishes the inability of the bank to generate a 
positive return to its shareholders in the the domestic business. Nevertheless, it catches the 
growth opportunities in emerging markets. 
The price target of BES was € 1.26, a buy recommendation to investors as it suggested a 
potential upside risk of 159%. 
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Moreover, a comparison between my results and those of Caixa BI’s Portuguese banking 
sector was underway from a constructive point of view, putting on display and commenting 
accurate methodological differences. 
Caixa BI’s report of the Portuguese financial system published on December 13, 2011 did 
not take into account the 2011 capital increase of € 530 mn. The bank revised BES fair value per 
share to € 2.7, down from the previous price target of € 4. Besides that, according to ESN 
recommendation system, the investment bank maintained its buy recommendation as opposed 






This equity research is concentrated on valuing a company listed in PSI20 stock 
exchange by applying a bunch of valuation models that signal buy or sell recommendations for 
the financial institutions in the form of price targets issued by the analyst. Those frameworks are 
carefully built, as such stressing out the assumptions and adjustments behind the estimates for 
the foreseeable periods. 
Moreover, a comparison between my results and those of Caixa BI’s Portuguese banking 
sector will be underway from a constructive point of view, putting on display and commenting 
accurate methodological differences. 
 The global economic outlook and the sovereign debt crisis in Euro zone were 
inspirational to pick BES as the subject of research since the bank is a market maker of the 
Portuguese Republic debt. The constant volatility in the banking sector fostered by the need of 
pursuing strict capital standards and the systemic funding shortfalls to run the business were no 
less relevant to move forward with this theme.  
Ruffling my dissertation, I intend to split it up into six core parts: 
I. Chapter One: Literature review is the critical material to break down the most suitable 
valuation frameworks in order to better assess BES’ value of equity. For a clear 
understanding, I decide to point out the main methodologies used for equity valuation, 
afterwards I go deep inside to demystify which ones would be particularly 
recommended for financial institutions. 
II. Chapter Two: Banking industry outlook comprises both the European and Portuguese 
scenarios for two reasons: First, from a broad sense point of view BES belongs to the 
European banking list; Second, it is no less relevant to have a close look at the 
Portuguese banking system to check the latest trends of the sector. 
III. Chapter Three: BES historical performance is covered to realize the strengths and 
weaknesses of the business, even though it does not offer any guarantees for the future 
of the company. 
IV. Chapter Four: Valuation of BES is based on what was previously discussed in the 
literature review, plus my assumptions to compute it properly. Later on, I come up with 
a final target price that signals a buy or sell recommendation to the potential investors. 
V. Chapter Five: Comparison with Caixa BI’ equity research report, attempting to figure out 
the main differences among the methodologies used and clarify why I believe my 
procedures are superior at some point. 
VI. Chapter Six: A final remark of the ongoing working process. 
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I. Literature Review 
A. Valuation approaches at a glance 
All valuation approaches express the same underlying model if the assumptions are 
consistent. 
Damodaran (2006)1 once said that “valuation lies at the heart of much of what we do in 
Finance”, ranging from the most simplistic to the most sophisticated models. By realizing there 
is a wide spectrum of models, each one highlights its own specificities to reach a final value for 
the equity when reporting different fundamentals. 
Despite that, we must recognize one thing: “every popular valuation approach is simply a 
different way of expressing the same underlying model” (Young, Sullivan, Nokhasteh, & Holt, 
1999)2. This is, all valuation methods are equivalent mathematically speaking, which means that 
starting from one model we are able to derive any other. Unless there are major differences in 
the estimates caused by different assumptions, the models can be directly compared in a 
consistent basis. 
In general terms, we know there are two methods to evaluate equity: direct or indirect. 
As the name suggests, direct method is straightforward as it achieves automatically the value of 
equity, whereas the latter one we value the whole company – broad picture, i.e., net debt is 
deducted from the enterprise value in order to reach the value of the company shares. 
Managing for value creation depends on long-term cash flows returns, rather than 
quarterly earnings per share. This is particularly interesting since on October 1, 1974, a paper 
from Wall Street Journal elucidated a special focus on earnings per share as an indicator of value, 
a contradiction to the discounted cash flow valuation concept (Rath & Sun, 2008)3.  
Managers thought they would fool the market by concentrating too much on reporting 
higher earnings per share each quarter – “Cash is King” phenomenon. This would be a good 
indication of no reliance to DCF concept. 
Concerning Damodaran (2006) and Férnandez (2007)4, there are four different valuation 
approaches: 
                                                          
1 Damodaran, A. (2006). Valuation Approaches and Metrics: A Survey of the Theory and Evidence. Stern 
School of Business. 
2 Young, M., Sullivan, P., Nokhasteh, A., & Holt, W. (1999). All Roads Lead to Rome: An Integrated Approach 
to Valuation Models. Goldman Sachs Investment Research. 
3 Rath, S., & Sun, L. (2008). The Development of Earnings Management Research. International Review of 
Business Research Papers, 265-277. 




Free Cash Flow to the Firm (FCFF) EV/EBITDA Economic Value Added (EVA) Option Theory
Free Cash Flow to the Equity (FCFE) EV/Sales Economic Profit (EP)
Dividend Discount Model (DDM) Price-to-Earnings (P/E) Cash Value Added (CVA)





Discounted Cash Flow Relative  Valuation Residual Income Approach Contingent Claim Valuation
Over the years financial analysts have been using these methods to value companies 
whether they are creating or destroying value. However, as my dissertation is an equity research 
of a financial institution known as Banco Espírito Santo, my comments will encompass specific 
valuation models related to the financial services firms such as banks. 
B. Cost of capital approach 
This method is not the best to derive an equity valuation for financial firms. 
By stating Damodaran (2001)5 we ascertain that in the case of financial services such as 
banks and insurance companies, the cost of capital approach does not apply so smoothly. Indeed, 
for financial service companies interest coverage ratio6 spreads must be calculated apart from 
those for the manufacturing companies in order to determine the ratings of the bonds. 
First of all, the interest coverage ratio spreads derived for manufacturing firms will not 
only deflate the bond rating even for the trustful banks, but also lead to a minor optimal debt 
ratio. The problem is that there is no direct correlation between bond ratings and interest 
coverage ratios. 
Secondly, given the difficulty in assessing debt due to a mix of short term borrowings, 
repos7, deposits and other liabilities, a good solution would be by focusing on interest coverage 
ratios involving long run interest expenses. 
At last, there is a conflict between optimal capital structure and capital adequacy 
standards launched by regulators, because most of the time seeking optimal debt ratio implies 
putting at risk mandatory capital ratios. 
Copeland, Koller, & Murrin (2000) admit at least two reasons why it is roughly tough to 
value bank’s equity stake by first computing the value of its assets (lending resources)8.  One of 
                                                          
5 Damodaran, A. (2001). Corporate Finance: Theory and Practice. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
6 EBITDA/Interest Expenses. 
7 Repurchase agreements. 
8
 The present value of interest income less administrative costs discounted at weight average cost of 
capital (WACC) then subtracting the present value of interest expenses and consumer administrative costs 
by discounting at cost of debt (Kd). 
Exhibit 1 – Valuation Methods 






Interest income Gross loans due New loans
+ Fee income - Provisions and unearned income + Increase in securities held
- Interest expense = Net loans paid + Increase in accounts receivable
- Provision for credit losses + Increase in deposits + Increase in net tangible assets
+ Non-interest expenses + Increase in external debt + Increase in other assets
+ FX income + Increase in other liabilities - Decrease in deposits




= Cash from operations + Sources - Uses
Free cash flow
Balance Sheet
the main sources of financing is non-interest bearing customer deposits raised in retail banking, 
thus its cost of capital dares to be difficult to valuate.  
Moreover, another problem related with cost of capital approach is connected to the 
loans interest, where its spread between it and WACC is so little that it might lead to huge 
discrepancies in the bank’s valuation due to bad estimation of WACC. (Copeland, Koller, & 
Murrin, 2000). 
The above exhibit is a good example of free cash flow to bank shareholders, where it is 
represented the cash inflows and outflows. Starting from the income statement, our eyes should 
be focused on provisions for credit losses and depreciation which are not cash flows. Its only 
purpose is to reduce taxes and therefore they should be added. On the source side, cash in comes 
from the paid loans minus the provisions and unearned income (net loans), adding positive 
changes in deposits, external debt, equity issues, etc. On the contrary, loans, increases in cash 
reserves and securities held are the relevant cash outflows (Copeland, Koller, & Murrin, 2000).  
As for Damodaran (2009)9, the free cash flow to the equity in the specific case of a 
normal firms is: 
                         
                                                                      
                             . 
                                                          
9 Damodaran, A. (April 2009). Valuing Financial Service Firms. pp. 1-34. 
Exhibit 2 – Free cash flow to bank shareholders 
Source: Copeland, Koller and Murrin (2000) 
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Unfortunately, for financial institutions we cannot forecast non-cash working capital and 
depreciation. By mentioning this, the author comes up with three solutions: 
 Suppose that dividends are the free cash flow to the equity holders; 
 Deem an adjustment in free cash flow to the equity by heightening the regulatory 
capital in financial institutions10; 
 Value excess returns instead of earnings, dividends and growth rates11. 
C. Equity cash flow model 
Granting permission for ECF model. 
Albeit free cash flow model to the firm is the recommended approach to value 
companies, the equity approach is the most suitable for banks since it is easier to account for the 
creation of value by the liability side of the balance sheet (Copeland, Koller, & Murrin, 2000). 
This is, as an analyst it is more relevant “to estimate its (company) share of expected future cash 
flows and then discount those flows at an opportunity cost that compensates the company for 
the risk it is bearing” (Luehrman, 1997)12. 
Limitations of CAPM. 
The share of company’s risk in investors’ equity portfolios can be directly compared with 
“its contribution to the risk of the portfolio of all outstanding equities – market portfolio” 
(Rosenberg & Rudd, 1986)13. The problem is lodged behind Richard Roll’s critique: CAPM cannot 
be tested, simply because there is no way to reach the real market portfolio. As a matter of fact, 
one of the proxies used to represent market portfolio is, for instance, S&P 500, which is as 
inefficient portfolio since it bears diversifiable risk (McQueen, 1986)14.  
General approval of CAPM. 
Thus, the beta, whose purpose is to measure systematic risk of a certain stock, will be 
biased by taking on risk of S&P 500 – the market proxy, in this particular case (McQueen, 1986).  
But, at the end of the day, the important thing to mention is that practitioners do use CAPM even 
with “the average-return anomalies of CAPM” (Fama & French, 1996)15. Whether they use 
single-index models or multi-index models, all of them rely on CAPM assumptions, agreeing that 
it is valid (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2009). 
                                                          
10                                                                       . 
11                                                                          
12 Luehrman, T. A. (1997). What's it Worth? Havard Business Review, 132-141. 
13 Rosenberg, B., & Rudd, A. (1986). The Corporate Uses of Beta. The Revolution in Corporate Finance, 58-
68. 
14 McQueen, J. (1986). Beta is Dead! Long Live Beta! Revolution in Coporate Finance, 52-68. 
15 Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (1996). The CAPM is Wanted, Dead or Alive. Journal of Finance, 1947-1958. 
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The business cash flows must take into account fixed financial claims16 and the discount 
rate must bear the risk inherent to those leveraged claims. The leverage property is of great 
importance when dealing with highly leveraged businesses, which is nothing more than banks’ 
situation (Luehrman, 1997).  
Historically, financial service firms have been using more debt as a source of capital than 
non-financial firms due to the predictability of earnings and less rigorous regulatory standards 
(Damodaran, 2009), which has been reversing lately as a consequence of new capital adequacy 
rations imposed by Basel III accord.  
1. Saying no to the Use of Option-Pricing Theory 
Going back to Luehrman (1997) reasoning, high leverage is viewed as if equity was a call 
option holded by shareholders. If the business is not on the rocks and managers act in the best 
interest of shareholders, they will “exercise the option” and pay bondholders what is owed. 
Unless it occurs that way, banks will default and be unable to provide bondholders their cash 
flows (periodic interest and redeemable principal at maturity). 
Nonetheless, option-pricing approach is too complicated in pratical terms because 
everytime there is a financial claim for the bondholders, the firm has to see wether they are 
going to exercise or not the option, which is time-consuming. Therefore, levered equity shows up 
as a sequence of options and options. Saying that so, equity cash flow models beats up option-
pricing model due to its feasibility. 
D. Dividend Discount Model 
A close look at the standard DDM – model attributed to Williams (1938). 
Since equity valuation models are “build on the notion that the market value of a share is 
the discounted value of the expected future payoffs generated by the share” (Francis, Olsson, & 
Oswald, 2000)17, dividend discount model (DDM) follows the same reasoning. 
DDM was launched by Williams in 1938, in which he equals the value of the equity stake 
to the present value of all expected dividends until the end of the firm’s lifecycle discounted at 
   . Therefore, a standard model would be: 
                          ∑
    
      
 
   
   
 
, where      expected dividend per share in period t ,    cost of equity  
                                                          
16 Interest, principal payments, etc. 
17 Francis, J., Olsson, P., & Oswald, D. R. (2000). Comparing the Accuracy and Explainability of Dividend, 




An extended DDM from Gordon (1962). 
By deriving a special case of DDM, namely the Gordon Growth Model, it is assumed that 
companies’ growth rates are stable over time. We should bear in mind that for this to be possible 
there are demanded two insights: dividend’s growth rate are expected not to be higher than the 
economy nominal growth rate; earnings growth rate must be equal to that of dividends in order 
to be in conformity with the steady rate.  Thus, the value of equity equals to (Gordon, 1962)18: 
                                 
    
    
 
, where,       expected dividend per share one year after and    expected growth rate of 
dividends in perpetuity. 
Some practitioners developed a two stage growth model where the value of a stock 
follows up a certain growth for the dividends during the explicit period and, thus for the 
terminal value it is considered a constant growth rate of dividends that will remain the same 
forever. Then, DDM is modified into (Damodaran, 2009): 
                          ∑
    
      
 
   
   
 
      
            
 
 
, where      expected dividend per share in period t 
    cost of equity capital 
   dividend’s expected growth rate in perpetuity 
      
            
   terminal value or Continuing value 
DDM usage in practical terms. 
DDM is specifically used in the banking sector, which is not prompted to change its 
capital structure regularly, preventing    to suffer drastic ups and downs. It is defined as the 
internal rate of return (IRR) that equals the discounted stream of expected dividends to the 
current market share price (Michaud & Davis, 1982)19. 
As the dividend discount model belongs to a vast list of equity valuation approaches, it 
highlights dividends as the true cash flow to the equity holders, meaning that when an equity 
                                                          
18 Gordon, M. J. (1962). The Savings Investment and Valuation of a Corporation. The Review of Economics 
and Statistics, 37-51. 
19 Michaud, R. O., & Davis, P. L. (1982). Valuation Model Bias and the Scale Structure of Dividend Discount 




holder invests in a listed company, he/she receives a return for bearing business risk and is, 
thus, compensated by the pay out of the investment – dividends. 
Nonetheless, companies do not always distribute dividends as part of them is retained 
for further investments, holding back on cash. As a result, if the equity value will be 
underweighted, the use of this method is restricted to the following conditions (Damodaran, 
2009): 
 Either by full payment of free cash flow to the equity holders as dividends due to the 
requirements coming from real estate investment trusts and the industry; 
 Or in the cases of financial institutions where the cash flows cannot be easily 
forecasted from the financial statements, arising queries about the acknowledgment 
of debt and deposits, plus working capital and capital expenditures (CAPEX). Hereby, 
the underlying assumption to resort to this model by analysts is that it is thought of 
the total pay-out of earnings as dividends.  
1. Measuring the advantages and disadvantages of DDM 
The pros … 
DDM is simple, intuitive since it is the only cash flow paid to the investors. Likewise, the 
model does not need a bunch of assumptions – basically what is necessary is the dividend from 
previous year and an estimate for growth rate    . Plus, dividends tend to remain stable over 
time and most of the time firms tend to pay-out the same share, in relative terms, of dividends, 
even when earnings are volatile. 
(…) and cons. 
DDM shows at least two limitations. First of all, most of the growth companies do not 
intend to pay out dividends amid the explicit period. Second, if the Modigliani-Miller Theorem is 
not rejected, dividend policy is at default non relevant. This is, whether companies own a cash 
pile or is positioned at lower limit threshold for financing policies, dividends does not add new 
information to valuation (Gode & Ohlson, 2006)20. 
Indeed, Penman (2011) say it right: “Dividends have to do with distribution of value, not 
the generation of value (…)”. 
Plus, Vernimmen, Quiry, Dallocchio, Fur, & Salvi (2009)21 find DDM to be complex. One of 
the main variables of DDM is   and they say it looks like a random figure. There is a prominent 
                                                          
20 Gode, D. K., & Ohlson, J. A. (2006). A Unified Valuation Framework for Dividends, Free Cash Flow, 
Residual Income, and Earnings Growth Based Models. New York University, 1-21. 
21 Vernimmen, P., Quiry, P., Dallocchio, M., Fur, Y. L., & Salvi, A. (2009). Corporate Finance: Theory and 
Practice. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
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symptom it is not associated with its openers (margin rate of return, dividend pay-out ratio, 
financial leverage22, etc.). In that sense, it may suggest that firms distribute profit randomly in 
spite of aligning dividends with their economic performance. 
The Francis, Olsson and Oswald (2000)23 paper admits that abnormal earnings model 
(see FOM) outperforms DCF and DDM by taking advantage of a low median absolute prediction 
error. This superiority can be explained by two factors: first, fewer distortions in accounting 
numbers than forecast errors when estimating growth and discount rates. Second, the 
predictability of the attributes confers more reliable estimates, minimizing the gap between the 
estimate and the realized value.  
E. Equity Excess Return Model 
1. The Feltham-Ohlson Model (FOM) 
 FOM is a linear information model that identifies a multi-period behaviour of abnormal 
earnings, i.e., the abnormal earnings can be forecasted with a regression analysis. Its purpose is 
to provide a framework for equity valuation by conjoining accounting variables (earnings and 
book values) with the introduction of information dynamics (Khodadad & Emami, 2010)24. 
The enthusiastic compliments of researchers have spread all over the world to the 
Feltham-Ohlson model (FOM). Lundholm (1995)25 stated that “Ohlson and Feltham present us 
with a very crispy yet descriptive representation of the accounting and valuation process”, i.e., 
create a connection between accounting numbers and valuation, reviving the residual income 
model when there was an easier access to analysts’ forecasts and computers to implement it (Lo 
& Lys, 2000)26. 
Likewise, referring to Frankel & Lee (1996)27, Ohlson model applies well to different 
accounting measures around the world and from a statistical point of view it has a good 
explanatory power when presenting high R2 in comparison with other traditional approaches. 
The information dynamics aimed at building bridges with the so-called dividend growth 
model created by a partnership between Gordon and Shapiro, albeit there is a particular 
                                                          
22 Net debt/Equity. 
23
 Francis, J., Olsson, P., & Oswald, D. R. (2000). Comparing the Accuracy and Explainability of Dividend, 
Free Cash Flow, and Abnormal Earnings Equity Value Estimates. Journal of Accounting Research, 45-70. 
24 Khodadad, V., & Emami, M. R. (2010). Comparative Assessment of Feltham-Ohlson Sign-Oriented & 
Traditional Models. International Research Journal of Finance and Economics, 1-17. 
25 Lundholm, R. J. (1995). A Tutorial on the Ohlson and Feltham/Ohlson Models:Answers to Some 
Frequently Asked Questions. Contemporary Accounting Research, 749-761. 
26 Lo, K., & Lys, T. (2000). The Ohlson Model: Contribution to Valuation Theory, Limitations, and Empirical 
Applications. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 337-367. 
27 Frankel, R. M., & Lee, M. C. (1996). Accounting Diversity and International Valuation. Working Paper. 
University of Michigan and Cornell University. 
17 
 
difference among these two models. The Ohlson model takes into account Modigliani & Miller 
(1958)28 perfect capital markets, which stresses out that: 
 There are no taxes and asymmetric information in the markets where firms operate; 
 Firms are able to raise both equity or debt from external financing sources without 
costs of issuance; 
 There are no bankruptcy and agency costs, hence the management board acts in a 
way that adds value to the equity holders and the bondholders should not be 
concerned of wealth expropriation related to dividend policy and 
investment/financing activities. 
The evidence of dividend irrelevancy for stock valuation is another indication that the 
model resorts to Miller & Modigliani (1961), notwithstanding it does not apply for Gordon-
Shapiro reasoning. Besides this limitation, there is room for improvement as long as tax effects 
are incorporated, agency and bankruptcy costs, asymmetric information and so on to 
compensate for the market imperfections and turn the model more realistic.  
Nonetheless, at the end of the day, the dividend growth model can be reformulated to 
find similarities with the Ohlson model, implying a final outcome that is nothing more than the 
summation of book value and a multiple of abnormal earnings (Lo & Lys, 2000).  
Shedding some light on three different residual income approaches, Férnandez (2002)29 
states that Economic Profit, Economic Value Added (EVA), Cash Value Added (CVA) does not 
make any sense to compute the value creation throughout the explicit period, although it is 
useful to measure individual performance (managers, business units). 
Tham (2001)30, Lundholm & O'Keefe (2001)31 and Férnandez (2002) show that Residual 
Income methods lead to the same result as the discounting cash flow (DCF) models.  Young, 
Sullivan, Nokhasteh, & Holt (1999) refer that each traditional valuation is no more than a 
“different way of expressing the same underlying model” and that can be compared directly to 
check which assumptions promotes misleadings in the valuations’ results.  
                                                          
28 Modigliani, F., & Miller, M. H. (1958). The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of 
Investment. The American Economic Review, 261-297. 
29 Férnandez, P. (2002). Three Residual Income Valuation Methods and Discounted Cash Flow Valuation. 
IESE Business School, 1-19. 
30 Tham, J. (2001). Equivalence between DCF and RI. J.F.K. School of Government, 1-18. 
31 Lundholm, R., & O'Keefe, T. (2001). Reconciling Value Estimates from the Discounted Cash Flow Model 
and the Residual Income Model. Contemporary Accounting Research, 311-335. 
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Penman & Sougiannis (1996)32 reinforces the idea by claiming that “dividend, cash flow 
and earnings approaches are equivalent when the respective payoffs are predicted to infinity” 
and in the short run analysis “accrual earnings techniques dominate free cash flow and dividend 
discount approaches” after “truncating” the model to be readily implemented in practical terms 
– the emergence of the terminal value or continuing value. 
Regarding Penman S. H. (2001)33 reasoning, the difference between the accrual 
accounting and cash flow accounting is a matter of measurement and recognition, however 
Lundholm & O'Keefe (2001) counter attacks by saying that accrual accounting can be 
transformed into “Voodoo accounting” and thus can raise differences between accrual earnings 
techniques and discounted cash flow models. 
Still on excess return models, Damodaran (2009) shows that there are two inputs to 
value stock: book value of equity and the present value of expected excess returns to equity 
holders, in which:  
                                                     .  
The reason why book value of equity is a more reliable measure than for manufacturing 
firms lies behind on mark-to-market financial assets of the banks. Moreover, since depreciation 
is quite low and capital expenditures are little it is hard to estimate financial services cash flows 
as if they were non-financial businesses. 
2. Problems associated with Residual Income Model 
 The conceptual framework that says RIV and PVED are equal is only truth if clean 
surplus34 holds on a per share basis, where the number of shares outstanding automatically 
remains constant and the issue price is equivalent to the change in book value at a certain date. 
Hence, from a dollar value perspective for RIV, the irrelevance of transactions (buy and 
issue shares) has to be set in accordance with Modigliani Miller theorem and GAAP should not 
violate clean surplus relation. Plus, any potentially dilutive securities should be crossed off 
(Ohlson, 2000)35. 
F. Relative Valuation 
From Damodaran A. (2006) perspective, a firm’s assets are valued based on similar 
tradable assets. Hereby, a potential investor gives a close look at the market price of similar 
                                                          
32 Penman, S. H., & Sougiannis, T. (1996). A Comparison of Dividend, Cash Flow, and Earnings Approaches 
to Equity Valuation. University of California and University of Illinois. 
33 Penman, S. H. (2001). On Comparing Cash Flow and Accrual Accounting Models For Use in Equity 
Valuation. Columbia University, 1-21. 
34 The change in book value equals to the difference between earnings and dividends among two periods. 
Therefore: Net income – Dividends = Retained earnings. 
35 Ohlson, J. A. (2000). Residual Income Valuation: The Problems. Stern School of Business, 1-24. 
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assets in order to reach a final conclusion in its decision. A multiple is a ratio of the market price 
to a value driver (earnings, revenues, book values, etc). 
Generally speaking, firms tend to concentrate too much on DCF approach, once they step 
forward with a project valuation and Goedhart, Koller, & Wessels (2005) advocates the careful 
use of Multiples to better assess the market value of a certain company. If the relative valuation 
is properly done, the main advantages consist of: 
 Reliability on cash flows forecasts; 
 Comparison of company’s performance with any other competitor; 
 Assessment of company’s strategic position  and value creation by keeping an eye on 
other players moves from the same sector. 
Such favoritism of DCF, an almost straightforward method that involves forecasting cash 
flows and discounting them at an appropriate rate commensurated with the business and 
financial risks of the firm can be a double-eged sword. First, it is roughly tough to estimate 
company cash flows accurately and secondly if the discount rate chosen is pure nonsense that 
can give rise to huge swings in its valuation (Lie & Lie, 2002)36. 
When concentrating on multiples vauation, all practitioners should comply with  the 
main four stages: in the first two stages consider the selection of the value driver and the 
identification of the comparable companies also known as peer group; in the third stage, after 
finding the comparable companies, a synthetic multiple should be computed; finally, in the 
fourth stage, to determine the value of the company we just have to multiply the synthetic 
multiple by the value drivers (Schreiner, 2006)37. 
The beauty of multiples analysis is that when carrying on the last stage of the valuation it 
is plenty useful to make a comparison between the value obtained from another methodolody 
and the one from multiples. Indeed, the bridge between these two valuations ease the discovery 
of any meaningful gap between the firm and the other competitors (Férnandez, 2001)38.  
According to Penman (2009), a multiple is nothing more than a ratio of the market price 
and a particular number of financial statements, varying from earnings, book values, sales and 
cash flows. Therefore, discoding this information into a simpler one, the so-called equity value 
multiples are: price-earnings ratio (P/E), price-to-book ratio (P/B), price-to-sales ratio (P/S) 
and, finally the price-to-cash flow ratio (P/CF). 
                                                          
36 Lie, E., & Lie, H. J. (2002). Multiples Used to Estimate Corporate Value. Financial Analysts Journal, 44-54. 
37 Schreiner, A. (2006). Equity Valuation Using Multiples: An Empirical Investigation. Roland Berger 
Strategy Consultants. 














 Regarding a wide range of multiples that can 
be computed, P/E and P/B tend to stand out due to its 
popularity. When having a close look at the valuation 
approaches most widely used by Morgan Stanley 
Dean Witter’s analysts in European companies, P/E 
ratio has no direct competition, occupying the first 
place, which represents, in relative terms, 50% of the 
analysts. In what concerns P/B ratio, it takes the sixth 
place corresponding to at least 15% of the analysts (Férnandez, 2001).  
 Férnandez (2011) also shows that the most popular multiple based on capitalization is 
P/E ratio and on company’s value is EV/EBITDA, depending on the industry. For instance, in 
financial services Damodaran (2009) reveals the superiority of P/E and P/B ratios. 
 The first one equals to: 
                     
               
                  
 
                   
    
 
When interpreting the assumptions behind the ratio we can figure out that P/E ratio is 
higher as long as financial institutions expect higher growth rates, payout ratios and lower costs 
of equity. One interesting aspect related to provisions for credit losses is whether a financial 
institution decides to give rise to it, the report income will shrink and, therefore a higher P/E 
ratio will persist and vice-versa. 
The remaining one is equivalent to: 
                          
               
                              
 
                      
    
 
This ratio will be high if earnings’ growth rates, pay-out of dividends and return on 
equity are expected to increase, ceteris paribus. As opposed to that, cost of equity must be low, 
otherwise major negative effects will reflect on the ratio.  
There is linkage between P/B ratio and ROE: the most attractable shares are the ones 
whose P/B ratio is quite low and present medium-high levels of ROE (Wilcox, 1984)39. This is 
basically a issue of a buy signal, i.e., the stock is cheap in the eyes of the potential investors. 
  
                                                          
39 Wilcox, J. J. (1984). The P/B-ROE Valuation Model. Financial Analysts Journal, 58-66. 
Exhibit 3 – Main multiples of the Relative 
Valuation 








               
                     
                         
                     
                  
                     
            
                     
          
                     
                     
           
          
           
           
                   
          
                   
               
                        
                  
                        
G. Dupont Analysis for banks 
Saunders & Cornett (2008)40 specifies a model of financial statement analysis for 
financial institutions - Dupont system of financial analysis return on equity model. This model 
splits up ROE into three parts: asset turnover, net profit margin and equity multiplier. The first 
component analyzes the left side of the balance sheets, i.e., assets; the second one gauges the 
income statement and the last one looks at the right side of the balance sheet, i.e., liabilities and 
equity. 
The purpose of using Dupont analysis is to carry out a comparative analysis amid 
individual banks and to observe not only the drivers of ROE, but also check earnings quality.  
ROE (see the above exhibit) is a measure of the return to shareholders generated by 
equity, in relative terms, and incorporates leverage. Hence, ROE is: 
    
          
      
 
           
      
 
       
      
                      
 If the bank is making profits, a higher equity multiplier increases ROE. Nonetheless, if it 
is making losses, the equity multiplier increases the probability of default, heightening the risk of 
bankruptcy. 
Although the equity multiplier is a key point to evaluate ROE it has its own limitations. 
Indeed, it does not consider all the risk related to the company’s underlying assets. As a result, 
Core Tier I is used to compensate this shortcoming.  
ROA is part of ROE and expresses the degree of profitability in relation to its assets. If we 
split ROA up and isolate its key factors we can order them by relevance (Lim, 2010)41: 
 Net interest income (NII); 
                                                          
40 Saunders, A., & Cornett, M. M. (2008). Financial Institutions Management. McGraw-Hill. 
41 Lim, A. (2010). Pan-European Banks. Matrix Group Research. 
 
Exhibit 4 –Breakdown of ROE into various financial ratios 
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 Net non-interest income; 
 Net non-operating income: 
 Operating costs; 
 Provisions for credit losses; 
 Income taxes. 
Another important factor to discriminate is the earnings quality. Of course that if a bank 
possesses a higher proportion of NII than volatile income and a small amount of provisions for 
credit losses, it is eventually an indicator of a better asset quality.  
As mentioned before, NII is a key element of ROA. Splitting it up we obtain the following 
formula: 
   
      
 
   
                       
 
                       
      
                                        
ROA can be improved by increasing net interest margin (NIM) and interest-earnings 
assets. The latter one is not a differentiating factor as it has been stable over time amid banks. In 
fact, interest-earning assets represent about 85-89% of total assets (Lim, 2010). Over the 
financial crisis banks have been achieving a considerable share of deposits from retail banking, 
which is a cheaper cost of funding than the wholesale borrowing market.  
1. Limitation of Dupont Analysis 
Although Dupont Analysis disaggregates ROE into different parts, it does not 
comprehend capital adequacy, asset and liquidity quality. As a consequence, the model has to be 
complemented with other tools such as Core Tier I, transformation ratio42 and non-performing 
coverage ratios. 
H. Cross-border valuation 
In the international outlook, a country’s equity market premium – excess return of the 
market portfolio over the risk free rate43 is not so straightforward to determine. The point is that 
investors usually require a premium for many other risks not considered in CAPM such as 
FOREX , sovereign, liquidity, industry risks, etc. 
Obviously, the discount rate obtained from CAPM may oscillate widely whether it is 
applied in a domestic or an international context. The acquiring firm operating in a different 
market would use the same discount rate as the other bidding firm only if the world’s stock 
                                                          
42 Loans-to-deposit ratio. 
43
 In Europe, German bunds are perceived to be risk free. 
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markets were fully integrated, i.e., the beta of the target company would be equal to both bidding 
companies in relation to the world index and the excess return would be a world-wide equity 
premium  (Bodnar, Dumas, & Marston, 2003)44. 
Notwithstanding, the financial integration in stock markets is limited, which gives rise to 
three questions concerning country risk premium: 
 Should we use the local premium?, i.e., the premium ascertained in the country 
where the target firm is operating; 
 Should we use the domestic premium where the capital comes from?; 
 Or, should we assume investors do not bear diversifiable risk?, therefore the best 
premium is the world-wide premium. 
 Damodaran (2009)45 stresses out that practitioners are too much focused on where the 
firm is incorporated rather than paying attention to where the business is run. Saying that so, a 
Brazilian company that reports little share of their revenues in its home country than in 
developed countries will be crucified by Brazilian sovereign risk as the cost of equity will rise 
heavily. 
Hereby, even if the company is less exposed to its home country by proceeding that way 
we will cut on its valuation, which is pure nonsense. The country risk premium can be estimated 
by three different ways: default spread for emerging market’s government bonds, the standard 
deviation of the emerging market to the US market, and a default spread multiplied by the ratio 
of equity market volatility to the government bond volatility – composite country risk 
premium46 (Damodaran, 2009). 
The author founds the latter approach to be more realistic as it relies on three different 
variables as mentioned above. 
In terms of the cost of equity capital computation, the guru of Finance promptly points 
out two methods:  
 If an investor believes that the firms exposure to sovereign risk is proportional to its 
exposure to the systematic risk – beta approach, then: 
                                                                 
 If an investors differentiate firm’s exposure to country risk from the market risk – 
lambda approach, then: 
                                                          
44 Bodnar, G. M., Dumas, B., & Marston, C. R. (2003). Cross Border Valuation: The International Cost of 
Equity Capital. National Bureau of Economic Research, 1-53. 
45 Damodaran, A. (2009). Volatility Rules: Valuing Emerging Market Companies. Stern School of Business. 
46                                            
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 In what concerns the discount of foreign currency cash flows, Kester & Froot (1997)47 
presents two different methods: 
 First, the parent company receives from the target company all the cash flows in foreign 
currency discounted at a consistent rate – foreign currency discount rate. After reaching a 
foreign currency NPV, this one  is converted at spot exchange rate to get a home currency result. 
 Second, the foreign currency free cash flows are directly converted to home currency, 
discounted at the local currency. This concept is suitable especially if the NPV in home currency 
is expected to change on a frequenty basis due to its sensitivity to exchange rates. The home-
foreign spot exchange rate is as follows throughout the years: 
       (
                          




Goedhart & Haden (2003)48 prefer to conceive two approaches in order to evaluate the 
emerging-markets risks: Cash Flow approach and Country Risk Premium approach. 
In the first method, the cash flows of an emerging-market business are based on two 
scenarios: under adverse economic distress or in accordance with the business plan – normal 
scenario. The author assumes a 20% probability of distress for an emerging market context by 
stating that during a financial turmoil this business would not be worth zero. 
Thus, expected cash flows would plunge more than a business from a developed country, 
but as this distress risk is diversifiable, cost of capital and beta remains the same. The risk would 
rather be reflected on the cash flows rather than in the cost of capital. 
At last, concerning  the second approach – country risk premium, the author adds 
additional risk to the cost of capital and this new discount rate is applied to the normal/usual 
cash flows for the business lifecycle. 
I. Final Remarks 
Throughout the literature review, it has hung in the air no single model is the best choice 
to value a financial institution. Bearing that in mind, I decided to value BES by four different 
                                                          
47 Kester, C., & Froot, K. A. (1997). Cross-Border Valuation. Harvard Business School, 1-21. 





Exhibit 5 - Euro-area bank lending to 
other EMU financial institutions (% of 
total assets) 
Source: ECB, DB Research 
models: Dupont analysis, Excess return model (Damodaran), free cash flow to the equity and 
relative valuation. 
Hence, the final decision for BES fair value will depend on how the model works in two 
different contexts: domestic and international operations. The one that will reflect better the 
expansion strategy in emerging economies and the decreasing contribution of the national 
activity to the net income in the next two years will be chosen. 
II. Banking Industry Outlook 
A. International banking after the recent financial crisis 
1. The Globalisation of Financial Markets 
Financial markets have become global over the years … 
According to Schildbach49, in a high degree of 
financial integration, the interbank relations share a 
significant proportion in the bank’s operations, even 
though Euro-area interbank lending has declined in the 
years before the financial turmoil. Also, lending to non-
bank financial institutions such as mutual & pension funds 
and insurance companies has grown but at lower rates.  
Traditionally, bank lending to domestic players 
accounted for a significant proportion. This preference can 
be explained by three reasons (ECB, 2011)50: 
 
 
 Macroeconomic slowdown was more expressive in foreign counterparts than in 
home countries; 
 European banks complied with tighter capital standards reducing leverage in non-
euro banks; 
 National governments persuaded banks to increase their lending to real economy to 
mitigate the impact of the financial turbulence; 
 State aid programmes played an important role to fill supranational/national capital 
requirements such as reduction, closure or sale of foreign business areas. 
  
                                                          
49 Schildbach, J. (2011). Home, sweet home? International banking after the crisis. Deutsche Bank, Research, 
Frankfurt am Main. 
50 ECB. (2011). Financial Integration in Europe.  
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Exhibit 7 - Western banks' cross-
border interbank funding (% of total 
assets) 
Source: BIS, ECB, FDIC, SNB, DB 
Research 
(…) leading not only to a high degree of international integration among the wholesale 
banking markets (…) 
Nevertheless, the development of EMU and a 
strengthened financial integration in EU wholesale 
markets contributed to its major fall a decade before the 
financial meltdown (from 60% in YE97 to 46% in summer 
2007). The euro-area bank lending to non-domestic 
markets rose to 23% and to other EU banks around 21%. 
In what concerns foreign lending there is evidence of a 
small exposure. Recently, other EU countries’ banks 
represent approximately 37% of global interbank lending, 
which is an affluent share (Schildbach, 2011).  
From a liability viewpoint – cross border 
interbank funding through loans and securities, Swiss and 
EU-15 banks together made up nearly 21% of their total assets, whereas for US banks it only 
accounted for 4%. After the peak in Spring 2008, American and Western European banks’ 
aggregated funding across borders went downhill to 8.3%, on average, after reaching 11.7% 
(Schildbach, 2011). 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, when having 
a close look at euro money markets51, banks’ exposure in 
home countries for secured transactions increased from 
32% in 2009 to 38% in 2010. On the other hand, regarding 
unsecured transactions, the exposure to national 
counterparties dropped 4p.p.52 (from 33% to 29%)(ECB, 
2011). This downward trend was also reflected for bank 
exposure to foreign counterparties both in secured and 
unsecured transactions.  
Generally speaking, there was evidence of 
decreasing unsecured transactions for (domestic, Euro area 
and Non-euro area), caused by a slump in lending 
to/borrowing from national and Euro-area counterparties, whereas in secured transactions, the 
rise in home countries and non-euro area counterparties was at the cost of diminishing exposure 
to foreign counterparties. 
                                                          
51 Markets for instruments with short maturities. 
52 From 33% to 29%. 
Exhibit 6 - Euro-area bank lending to 
other banks (By counterparty location, in 
% of total) 
Source: ECB, DB Research 
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Greece Portugal Ireland Spain
May 8.2% 1.6%
June 19.8% 7.7% 15% 1.3%
July 20.5% 15.3%
Peripheral Banks
In respect to refinancing operations within banks 
and central bank, the portion of domestic collateral used 
fell from 2002 to 2008, as banks preferred to exchange 
foreign assets for ECB funding. Interestingly, since the 
outbreak of euro sovereign debt crisis in 2010 followed by 
ongoing rating downgrades, cross-border collateral turned 
less appealing (Schildbach, 2011).  
The Equity Research team of JP Morgan updated on 
September 13 the movements in the EUR interbank 
market. 3M EURIBOR did not follow the drop in 3M EONIA 
swap rate as the latter one plunged from 0.9% (August 30) to 0.7%.  
Instead, the spread between EURIBOR and EONIA on a 3 month basis went up to 84bps 
in comparison with the 65 bps obtained in the preceding two weeks of this explicit period 
(Abouhossein, et al., 2011)53. 
In July 2011 two peripheral banks 
such as greek and irish increased their 
level of dependency on ECB: greek banks 
from 19.8% in the previous month to 
20.5% and irish ones from 15% to 15.3%. 
In June 2011, the remaining polemical 
peripheral banks reduced reliance on ECB liquidity: Portugal from 8.2% in May to 7.7% and 
Spain from 1.6% to 1.3% (Steenis, Tondi, Antonucci, & Timperley, 2011)54. 
(…)but also to a rise in international investment activity and cross-border banking relation 
with non-bank clients. 
G20 countries55 received the highest 
share of FDI inflows56 accounting for at least 
70% in 2010, in which emerging markets 
played a major role – China ($ 207 billion), 
                                                          
53 Abouhossein, K., Kot, J., Ranjan, A., Lee, D., Becerril, J., Cicconetti, E., et al. (September 13 2011). 
European Banks. Funding and Liquidity Tracker, p. 1. 
54 Steenis, v. H., Tondi, F., Antonucci, D., & Timperley, A. (29th July of 2011). European Banks. ECB survey 
highlights the challenge for bank lending, pp. 1-4 
55 19 central banks:  Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, Canada, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. 
56 Foreign Direct Investment inflows. 
Exhibit 8 - Collateral used in ECB 
refinancing operations 
Source: ECB, DB Research 
Exhibit 9 - Peripheral banks' reliance on ECB liquidity 
Source: Morgan Stanley 




Brazil ($ 48 billion), Russia ($ 41 billion) and India ($ 23 billion). OECD countries57 represented 
only 55% of the total FDI inflows (OECD, 2011)58. 
In addition, the FDI inflows in EU-15 
banks reached the top in 2007, even though 
outward flows outperformed them, thanks to 
a considerable presence of Western EU banks 
in emerging markets. Nonetheless, after the 
financial turmoil, FDI volumes slumped 
heavily, remaining a small volume of outflows 
(Schildbach, 2011). Pointing at FDI outward 
flows, after the dramatic declines in 2008 and 
2009, world countries increased by 7.5% to $ 1,197 billion in 2010. As for OECD countries, they 
accounted for 85% of total FDI outflows ($ 1,108 bn), facing a climb of 11% from 2009, in which 
the most representative countries were: USA ($ 346 bn), France ($ 123 bn) and Germany ($ 97 
bn) (OECD, 2011).  
Most of the FDI investments are the so-called mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Up to 
2007, those deals rose substantially, hitting the top, however right after the economic and 
financial downturn, M&A transactions (the majority of domestic moves) were easily countable 
as volumes turned out to be quite low in 2009. Recently, cross-border M&A have been 
recovering, even though absolute values were small-scale (Schildbach, 2011).  
In a broad sense, the percentage of foreign-owned 
banks in the EU-25 rose until the crisis from 23% in 2003 
to 29% in 2007 (6 p.p.) due to an increasing share of other 
European banks, stressing out the strength of the European 
market integration. Over the years, the market share of non 
EU banks tended to stabilise, which indicates that it was 
not the main driver of the foreign-owned banks’ rise 
(Schildbach, 2011).  
  
                                                          
5734 countries; Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States 
58 OECD (May 2011). Investment News. Issue 15. 
Exhibit 12 - Market share of foreign-
owned banks in the EU-25 
Source: ECB, DB Research 




Furthermore, cross-border bank lending to non-
banks is limited in the euro-area financial market. The point 
is that all the loans granted by european financial 
institutions to non-financial business in other EU did not 
exceed 8% of the total book of loans to non-banks. As 
opposed to this, EMU accounted for almost two-thirds. One 
good example was when German banks (one of the EMU 
countries) granted an amount of € 2,584 bn out of a total of 
€ 2,773 bn to private households, corporates and 
governments in Germany and the remaining € 189 bn 
would go for other european countries such as France, Italy, 
Spain, etc. 
2. Portuguese banking  system 
The loan loss reserves increase at a fast pace … 
In Q3 2011, the main six Portuguese banks’59 banking activity measured by total assets 
levelled off after a major drop in the Q1 2011 caused by a decline of the available for sale 
financial assets portfolio and the disposal of loans portfolio.  
Concerning the data on a consolidated basis, total assets suffered a virtual increase of 
0.1% in relation to the Q2 2011, however yoy60 results plunged by 2.5% – see appendix 
1(Portugal B. o., 2011). As regards the net credit to customers, its slight drop revealed an 
upward leap of credit provisions (impairments), a driver of the cost of risk to impose against the 
surge of the overdue loans, whereas the credit portfolio seemed not to recede. 
Shedding some light on the financial assets portfolio of the Portuguese banking system, 
the improvement of the derivative instruments in the trading portfolio averaged out the 
downward trend of debt and equity securities (Portugal B. o., 2011). 
The need of complying with the capital standards was witnessed by the rise of customer 
resources (deposits) of 1.9% qoq61, while debt securities fell down. The funding from central 
banks and other institutions also rose slightly. Furthermore, the decline of subordinated debt62 
                                                          
59 Caixa Geral de Depósitos, Espírito Santo Financial Group, Millennium BCP, Banco Português de 
Investimento, Banco Santander Totta and Caixa Económica Montepio Geral, accounting for 77% of the 




62 According to the new capital policies, they are not eligible in terms of CT1, making them sort of an 
unattractive source of funding. 
Exhibit 13 - Euro-area cross border 
bank lending to non-banks (by 
counterparty location, in % of total 
lending to non-banks) 
Source: ECB, DB Research 
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of 15.9% qoq lied behind the banks’ repurchase of their own bonds, taking advantage of the 
discount at the secondary market - see appendix 1 (Portugal B. o., 2011). 
In what concerns income pre-tax and minority 
interests they decreased sharply, leading to less 
satisfying profitability ratios – see appendix 2. The 
cause of this fall was due to a relevant decrease of the 
financial assets portfolio, which included a 21% 
deduction of the nominal value of all the long positions 
in Greek debt (Portugal B. o., 2011). 
 The release of impairments also impacted 
negatively the profitability ratios, although not so harsh 
as the previous quarter (Q2 2011). 
Giving an in-depth look at interest and non-
interest income, both tended to stabilise, whose path 
signalled resilience throughout the turmoil period. Likewise, it was notorious the diligence to 
reduce operating costs, whose purpose was to seek higher levels of efficiency (lower cost-to-
income ratio). 
Considering the own funds adequacy ratio, in September 2011 there was a slight dip 
from 8.4% to 8.3% provided not only by the actuarial deviations of the banks’ pension 
obligations, but also the 21% deduction aforementioned – see appendix 3 (Portugal B. o., 2011). 
B. Banking profitability in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis 
At first instance, European bank profitability seemed to boost more than expected … 
Stressing out profit and loss trends from Scheuermeyer 
(2011)63, European banks have started to grow slowly, although 
more than was actually expected. The main drivers of the profits’ 
recovery were: 
 Constant increase in NII64; 
 Rebound in trading income; 
 Decrease of loan loss provisions. 
First of all, starting by NII, it is the most important 
component in terms of banking revenues. From the 
                                                          
63 Scheuermeyer, P. (August 3 2011). Talking Point. Bank Profitability After the Crisis, pp. 1-2. 
64 Net interest income. 
Exhibit 15 - P&L trends at Europe's top 
20 banks 
Source: Company reports, DB Research 
Exhibit 14 - ROA and ROE of the six major 
banking groups 
Source: Bank of Portugal 
Note: Quarterly data have been 
annualized. Indicators calculated on 




financial crisis onwards, this upward trend was a result of a slump in central bank rates and 
funding costs (Scheuermeyer, 2011). Notwithstanding, it is important to stress that NII only 
grew 2.9%65 from 2008 to 2011 – see appendix 5 (Spick, 2011)66.  
Although trading income is highly volatile, there was a jump to €60 bn of profits in 2010 
right after announcing a loss of €30 billion in the previous year (2008) (Scheuermeyer, 2011). 
The fact is that European banks tended to be ex-growth and without accounting for this variable, 
CAGR of revenues was near 2.1% - see appendix 5 (Spick, 2011).  
Last but not the least, the decline in loan loss provisions was beneficial as it turned out to 
be just one third in comparison with post-crisis highs. However, the sovereign debt crisis and 
fiscal consolidation may provoke loan losses to rise, i.e., pushing up loan losses provisions to 
have a bigger share in P&L statements (Scheuermeyer, 2011). 
In what concerns fee and commission income generated by securitized and structured 
products the moment preceding the recent crisis, it has been falling as investors’ risk aversion 
tended to increase, implying higher returns for the same level of risk (risk/return trade-off). 
(…) however, analysts defend they will go ex-growth – a downside reaction to sluggish 
macroeconomic conditions. 
Strangely, after all these statements, future prospects for banking profit growth will 
tremendously slow. The problem is that the drivers of an increasing net income until 2007 will 
probably not be able to improve the post-crisis figures in the medium/long run. When all were 
just “peace & love”, low interest rates, fast lending growth and low credit losses were the 
components that helped net income boost mostly in an unsustainable direction. 
Over Q2 2011 earnings for 46 banks under Deutsche Bank coverage, the adjusted profit 
forecasts plunged by 8% both in 2011 and 2012 due to a weak NII and trading income, operating 
costs and high expectations for bad debt expenses – see appendix 4(Spick, 2011). 
For those countries that went through a real estate bubble, credit growth will be almost 
static on behalf of private households needing to diminish their indebtedness. On the other side, 
for those countries that did not suffer from a real estate crisis, all the developments inherent to 
low interest rates will lead to small net income margins. 
Likewise, there is another side of the story: As long as interest rates start to rise, funding 
costs will also jump. At some point we have the possibility to check this out from the capital 
standards of Basel III, deposit insurance premiums, higher sovereign refinancing costs, etc. From 
                                                          
 




a volume perspective, the effect of higher interest rates is damaging for the credit growth, which 
slows NII. 
It is also intriguing that top management is conscious about the negative effects of 
stricter regulatory rules and they spend little time developing strategies to overcome some of 
their limitations (Marrs & Rizzi, 2011)67.  
As the benefits of decreasing interest rates start to mitigate, NII slows down, putting at 
risk the possibility of this component acting as the main source of revenue. More than that, a 
sluggish economic growth allied to an increasing sovereign indebtedness quite slims down 
credit growth and enables the end of low loan loss provisions. At last, since trading income 
suffers ups and downs on a frequent basis due to fresh and stricter regulations, banking 
profitability scenario does not look appealing. 
A McKinsey Global Survey of executives in financial services says inquiries expected little 
growth in respect to ROE because only 19% of the respondents claimed this financial ratio 
exceeded 15% in the previous fiscal year – pre-crisis expectations (Marrs & Rizzi, 2011)68 – see 
appendix 6. 
Thus, how can banks achieve growth in such an adverse scenario? There are at least 
three strategies European banks should pursue in the near future (Spick, 2011): 
 Investments abroad in emerging markets; 
 Cost-cutting programmes measured by cost:income ratios and costs to market 
capitalization; 
 M&A, albeit from the point of view of the author it had destroyed value historically69. 
C. Basel III accord 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has a word on capital adequacy requirements… 
Basel III consists of “the Basel Committee’s reforms to strengthen global capital and 
liquidity rules with the goal of promoting a more resilient banking sector”, since it is the 
“foundation for sustainable economic growth” (BIS, 2010). 
Concerning the press release on September 12 201070, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision approved higher global capital standards, first discussed on July 26 2010. This 
                                                          
67 Marrs, A., & Rizzi, W. (2011). Mckinsey Global Survey results. Assessing banks' confidence after the 
crisis, pp. 1-9. 
 
69 Throughout history (1999 – 2011), the 46 banks assessed by Deutsche Bank made 650 acquisitions 
adding up to €679 bn. Nonetheless, the current market cap for this set of banks was just €630 bn, 
meaning that over 12 years, they were unable to create value for the banking sector. 
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reforming package heightens the minimum common equity as of January 2015 from 2% to 4.5% 
plus a conservation buffer of 2.5% to ensure loss absorbing capital for periods of financial stress, 
making a total of 7%. As for Tier 1 capital and total capital they must account for 6% and 8%, 
respectively, in addition to a conservation buffer of 2.5% - see appendix 7. 
Likewise, a countercyclical buffer within 0% - 2.5% range of common equity or other 
type of loss absorbing capital is recommended to provide insurance for periods of excess credit 
growth. Regarding the leverage ratio, the Basel Committee will test a minimum Tier 1 leverage 
ratio of 3% under a certain period of time (from Jan 1 2013 – Jan 1 2017) aiming to migrate to 
Pillar 1 on January 1 2018, right after a model calibration taking into account all the 
observations during the testable period – see appendix 8. 
These capital requirements will be phased-in between January 1 2013 and January 1 
2015. As of January 1 2013 banks will have to comply with certain requirements in relation to 
risk-weighted assets – see appendix 8: 
 3.5% common equity/RWA; 
 4.5% Tier 1/RWA; 
 8% total capital/RWA. 
The regulatory adjustments71 should be totally deducted from common equity by 1 
January 2018, meaning that as of 1 January 2014 will be deducted only 20% from common 
equity and from that moment on it will increase 20 p.p. until it reaches 100% (fully deduction) – 
see appendix 8.  
There will also be a transition arrangement for the conservation buffer which will go 
from January 1 2016 to YE 2018, starting at 0.625% of RWA, adding up each year 0.625 p.p. until 
it becomes fully effective on January 1 2019 – see appendix 8. 
Capital injections from national governments will persist until January 1 2018. Capital 
instruments not qualified as Tier 2 will be withdrawn during 10 years and from January 1 2013 
onwards will be derecognized by 10 p.p. per year. On the other hand, the capital instruments 
that do not belong to common equity Tier 1 will be eliminated from common equity as of 
January 1 2013 – see appendix 8. 
D. Troika measures for the Portuguese financial sector 
After EU, IMF and ECB approved Portugal’s bailout program, it is demanded from the 
Portuguese nation an outstanding effort to achieve the objectives proposed by the Troika board. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
70 BIS. (September 17 2010). Press release. Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision announces higher 
global minimum capital standards, pp. 1-7. 
71 Deductions and prudential filters. 
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Therefore, there is a special concern on those subjects to ensure financial stability and eliminate 
further negative effects in this weak economy (Commission, 2011)72: 
1. Liquidity 
Bank of Portugal agreed on the issuance of government guarantees bank bonds, totalling 
€35 bn and for bank collateral about €28 bn as it would be a fair amount for the banking 
refinancing needs (IMF, 2011)73; 
2. Deleverage programme 
Bank of Portugal (BoP), ECB, European Commission and IMF established leverage ratios 
for banks and those must be committed to the planning of deleverage programmes in the 
medium term as they will be assessed by BoP on a quarterly basis through SDAF74. 
3. Capital buffers 
All Portuguese banks must obtain a core Tier 1 of 9% by year end 2011 and 10% until 
the end of 2012, maintaining it ahead through deleverage and capital increases. This rule is 
broadly in line with a weak July EBA stress test. Likewise, BoP will submit new stress tests on a 
quarterly basis to check the need of regular capital increases. At the moment, it is not expected 
further deposits to the BSSF75 account at the BoP.  
4. Caixa Geral de Depósitos 
This state-owned bank is forced to strengthen its capital ratio. The group plans the sale 
of its insurance arm and non-core subsidiaries plus the reduction of cross-border operations, if 
necessary. 
5. Solvency and liquidity 
Bank of Portugal has been working on the improvement of solvency and deleverage 
mechanisms. It sought a review from EC, ECB and IMF specialists to see the main weaknesses of 
them at end-September 2011. In the end of June 2011, for the supervision of solvency 
parameters, BoP pointed out the assets that could be validated for the assessment after relying 
on EC, ECB and IFM competencies (Commission, 2011). 
                                                          
72 Commission, E. (May 17 2011). Portugal. Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy 
Conditionality, pp. 7-10. 
73 IMF. (2011). Portugal: First Review Under the Extended Arrangement. IMF Country Report No. 11/279, 
(pp. 11-13). 
74 The Solvency and Deleveraging Assessment Framework. 
75 Bank Solvency Support Facility. 
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6. Regulation and supervision 
BoP was concerned of recruiting new banking supervisors to clarify the recognition of 
non-performing loans and implement a stricter bank evaluation system. Furthermore, bank and 
deposit guarantee fund legislation was updated in accordance with EC, ECB and IMF heads 
(Commission, 2011). 
7. Corporate and household debt restructuring  
By end-December 2011, the Insolvency law was amended in consultation with IMF 
supervisors and corporate stakeholders so that restructuring plans would move faster in the 
court. Tax and social security administrations were allowed to use a wider range of 
restructuring tools as long as creditors approved the restructuring of their claims. As for 
restructuring tools, they were communicated for instance through training, information means, 
etc (IMF, 2011). 
8. Corporate and household monitoring 
The authorities were on the field to enhance financing opportunities for SME especially 
coming from the financial markets and a quarterly report of corporate and household sectors 
were underway to check out the last events. As SME sector is delicate, the ministry of Economy 
was planning the opening of a credit extension. 
E. EBA’s EU stress test in 2011 
On July 15 2011, European Banking Authority revealed the results for EU stress test 
covering a total of 90 banks in 21 countries. The purpose was to assess the financial stability of 
the largest banks in Europe in an adverse scenario taking into account a deterioration of some 
macroeconomic variables such as GDP, unemployment and house prices. The bank resilience 
was tested against the highest quality capital named Core Tier 1 (CT1) set at 5% of RWA (EBA, 
2011)76. 
As a whole, eight banks77 failed the stress tests since their CT1 ratio fell below the 
threshold of 5% in the adverse scenario adding up to a shortfall of €2.5 bn (EBA, 2011). 
Interestingly, Deutsche Bank European Banks Team believed “the risks are also rising, and the 
amount of €2.5 bn capital to be raised is no game-changer” (Spick, 2011)78 as it looked too 
optimistic to be credible. On the contrary, sixteen banks were within the range 5% - 6% (EBA, 
2011). However, it should not be forgotten that if there were not any capital increases during the 
                                                          
76 EBA. (2011). 2011 EU-Wide Stress Test.  
77 Two greek, five spanish and one Austrian. 
78 Spick, M. (July 17 2011). Stress Tests.  
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first four-month period of 2011, twenty banks would be placed below the benchmark threshold, 
implying a total shortfall of €26.8 bn (Moec, Stringa, Wall, Buckley, Grady, & Heider, 2011)79. 
Also, EBA recommends the national entities to oblige banks which fall below the 5% 
threshold to recapitalize in the near future. Furthermore, the banks whose CT1 is above 5% of 
RWA and still have high sovereign exposures should comply with specific criteria in order to 
strengthen their capital ratios (Moec, Stringa, Wall, Buckley, Grady, & Heider, 2011). 
1. General analysis by country 
Information provided by Fitch Ratings80: 
a) Spain 
From the Spanish banking system, seven banks and 18 saving banks groups undertook 
stress tests, accounting for 93% of market share, in which five banks were unable to reach the 
minimum 5% CT1 of 5%. 
As a matter of fact, the weakest financial institutions had large exposures to the real-
estate and construction sectors and low capital levels, needing support from FROB81 to pass the 
5% mark through mandatory convertible preference shares and capital. 
Focusing on the generic reserves, they were not used to absorb capital losses and from 
Fitch Ratings point of view that would raise ratios of a large bank sample to above 6%. 
As opposed to the weakest banks, Spain’s largest banks – Santander and BBVA reported 
CT1 of 8.4% and 9.2% at year-end 2012 under the adverse scenario, respectively. Both banks 
benefited from retail banking earnings and international diversification, even though there were 
applied stringent assumptions to the Spanish banking system. For instance, the retail mortgage 
portfolio suffered a cumulative house-price decline until 2012 of 21.9% and the real estate 
sector a cumulative property price decline of 46.7% - well above the EU average. 
b) Italy 
Italian banks still need to progress in terms of capital increases as the €10 bn of fresh 
capital during 2011 was not enough. Taking into account the Bank of Italy, Italian banks must 
reinforce their capital position of about €20 bn to be in accordance with the 2019 Basel capital 
standards. 
                                                          
79 Moec, G., Stringa, M., Wall, M., Buckley, G., Grady, C., & Heider, M. (July 22 2011). Focus Europe. Euro 
Summit at the Top of Our Expectations. 
80 Ratings, F. (July 20 2011). Spanish, Italian and Portuguese banks: EBA stress test results. Funding: Cost 
and access remain common concerns, pp. 1-11. 
81 Fondo de Reestructuración Ordenada Bancaria – Banking bailout and reconstruction program. 
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The credit risk implied by the loan book was the main concern as the Italian economy 
remains sluggish, leading to the deterioration of impairments not only in a tough scenario, but 
also in the baseline scenario. 
In respect to the profitability of the Italian financial sector when considering the 
toughest scenario, it is under pressure since four of the five banks report losses in 2011. 
Concentrating on the main driver of income – NII, from 2009 onwards it suffered steadily by the 
drop of the interest rates, reducing the spreads over customer deposits when scrutinizing the 
loan portfolio. Indeed, higher short-term interest rates would be helpful on the interest gained 
from the loan portfolio. However, given the systematic sovereign downgrades, funding costs 
boosted, reversing the positive impact on generating earnings.  
A good solution entails, first and foremost, restructuring loans and accessible funding 
sources to support earnings more easily. Likewise, cost cutting programmes would make 
profitability to progress well, improving operating efficiency in a consistent direction. 
c) Portugal 
Portuguese banks are expected to act according to more stringent regulations as part of 
the banking bailout terms, requiring banks to reach a minimum CT1 of 9% by year-end 2011 and 
10% by year-end 2012. If banks fail the targets, they could fund themselves by an amount of €12 
bn available by the EU and IMF, a parcel included in the €78 bn bailout package. 
The deterioration of profitability was impelled by loan impairments to a certain extent 
and also by sovereign debt crisis under the adverse scenario. The first one leads to losses from 
customer loans and the latter one is based on trading losses, which conjoined with increasing 
funding costs, cuts off dramatically the profitability growth as can be suggested by the climbing 
of Portuguese credit default swaps in comparison with the German’s. 
Plus, financial sector rating was naturally linked to sovereign downgrades developments, 
meaning that a negative outlook for Portuguese sovereign risk led to a downside risk in banks 
and enterprises, following up further prospects of GDP growth, unemployment rates and 
consumer index prices evolution. As a result, the financial sector has been suffering to fund 
through the secondary market funding and to get rid of subprime loans. 
d) Greece 
In Greece, the banks82 assessed represented almost the whole Greek banking system. 
Four of the banks under the stress test were reasonably capitalised after the equity raise and the 
compulsory restructuring programmes, in which two banks were considerably above the 
                                                          




minimum 5% CT1 and the remaining two are above but near the benchmark. In order to 
increase the capital adequacy, Greek financial institutions has been stepping forward as 
mergers/sales of subsidiaries, convertible bonds issuance, disinvestments are underway 
(Finance, 2011)83. 
According to the Memorandum of economic and financial policies for Greece, they 
needed to take several steps such as: 
 Maintain minimum CT1 of 10% from the beginning of 2012; 
 Diagnose bank’s loan portfolios in consultation with EC, ECB and IMF and raise 
capital buffers at maximum end-September 2012, taking into account the  final 
outcome reached by an international advisory firm; 
In the meantime, if the most influential banks do not present solutions for equity raising 
in pre-determined deadlines, some measures should be pursued with the approval of EC 
(Finance, 2011): 
 Financial Stability Fund Scheme – the main purpose is to strengthen the capital 
adequacy ratios of Greek banks, augmenting financial stability; 
 Recapitalization close to a total amount of €5 bn and a remaining of €1.2 bn, valid 
until end of 2011. 
2. Espírito Santo Financial Group stress test results 
Espírito Santo Financial Group results came from the consolidation of BES, which 
represents 97% of the consolidated assets of the group plus the remaining associations (BES, 
2011)84. 
According to the BoP release for ESFG stress tests results, CT1 ratio would be 5.8% 
under a shock scenario in 2012 in comparison with the 6.5% obtained in year-end 2010. Most 
importantly is that this outcome aggregated the effects provided by the measures announced 
and applied until 30 April 2011, albeit it put aside further management actions and business 
strategies from that moment on (Portugal B. O., 2011)85. 
ESFG passed on the tests, however in the very short term and taking into account a CT1 
ratio of 6% on behalf of the shock scenario in 2012, the group had to increase capital or sell non-
core assets of about €145 mn in the next three month period after publishing the results. The 
group was already on the field not only by disposing a part of its loan portfolio until the end of 
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84 BES. (July 15 2011). BES informs about stress tests results. 
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2011, but also by buyback of hybrid instruments, affecting about 0.5 percentage points of the 6% 
CT1 for the 2012 adverse scenario (Portugal B. O., 2011). 
One interesting fact that I would point out is that the measures pursued at end-April 
2011 until the date of BoP publication (July 15 2011) would be enough to cover 6% of the RWA. 
III. BES Developments 
A. BES group presentation 
As of 30 March 2012, BES was the largest domestic financial institution listed in PSI20 
index with a market capitalization of about € 2 bn, being placed in 4th by weight. The successful 
profile of BES group translated into the 2nd Portuguese private bank by total assets of € 80,2 bn 
with an average local market share of 19.3% in FY2011 and around 2.2 mn customers over the 
world (BES, 2012). 
The bank operates in different segments such as Private Banking, Retail Banking, 
Corporate and Institutional Clients, Asset Management, Investment Banking and International 
Commercial Banking.  
 Regarding the shareholder 
structure after the bank privatization in 
1991/1992, in which there was an alliance 
between Espírito Santo Financial Group 
(ESFG) and Crédit Agricole, it has been 
stable over time. They hold jointly 35% of 
BES through Bespar. Morever, Crédit 
Agricole holds a direct stake of 10.3% in 
BES. The other strategic partners - 
Bradesco, Portugal Telecom Group and 
Silchester own 4.8%, 2.1% and 5.6% as 
December 2011, respectively. The free float accounts for 49.45% composed by international 
institutionals (20.38%), domestic institutionals (10.49%) and individuals & corporates 
(18.58%). 
As a motivation to seek for long term profitability, BES Group has been showing a special 
concern on international expansion for what they call the strategic triangle: Angola, Brazil and 
Spain. The rationale behind it goes alongside with the need to augment the dynamics in 
emerging markets that reveal cultural and economic linkage with Portugal. 
Exhibit 16 - BES Main Shareholders 
Source: Company Website (December, 2011) 
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Furthermore, BES Group has been encouraging small and medium enterprises to export 
by granting international credit that allows for an “internationalisation of BES corporate client 
base” as it is stated in BES Group presentation. 
Likewise, investment banking is taking on an importance capable of generating more and 
more brokerage86 and M&A financial advisory87 fees to increase non-interest income. 
As for domestic businesses, the strategic movements go hand in hand not only with the 
need of intensifying customer funds, but also by taking advantage of cross-selling insurance to 
foster banking income growth. The local core competences are corporate banking, trade finance, 
private banking and investment banking. 
Concerning the BES share price, from the 
beginning of the crisis88 until February 2009, it 
accompanied all the developments of the 
underlying index.  
The thing was that on a cumulative basis 
the net return89 was similar, however, BES started 
to distance from the index due to a spiral of 
Portuguese downgrade ratings aligned with a debt 
euro crisis that affected directly banks, increasing 
their cost of funding. As a result, BES share price has absorbed all the bad news and dropped 
drastically, giving the impression the bank is being traded at a cheap price. 
B. Main indicators 
1. Activity 
The recent activity was negatively affected by the euro 
zone financial crisis, giving rise to an implementation of 
a Portuguese financial bailout powered by EBA, IMF, EU 
and the Government. Due to the deterioration of 
macroeconomic conditions, these entities promoted 
strict targets to help financial balance sheets get 
healthier by impelling an aggressive deleveraging 
programme.  
                                                          
86 BES ranks #1 in Portugal and #4 in Spain. 
87 BES is placed at #1 in Portugal, #1 in Iberian market and #5 in Brazil. 
88 I considered October 2007 the reference base since at that time DJ STOXX 600 banks index in euros 
started to drop sharply for the first time. 
89 In percentage. 
Exhibit 18 - BES Activity in million euros 
(includes securitized credit) 
Source: BES annual reports 
Exhibit 17 - Performance of BES Share Price 
versus Index in  
Terms of Net Return (Reference Base Period: 




Exhibit 19 - Share of international and domestic 
funds in million euros 
Source: BES Financials 
Over time, customer funds had an impressive growth, especially in 2009 when it reached 
its peak, as certificates of deposit drove on-balance sheet customer funds to increase by 8.6% 
(from € 38,189 mn in 2008 to € 41,473 mn in 2009). Likewise, off-balance sheet customer funds 
improved right after reporting in 2008 a negative trend, leading to a growth of 9.2%. 
 Nonetheless, in 2010 debt securities placed with clients diminished by 49.6%, revealing 
the loss of confidence of the international investors thanks to the constant sovereign 
downgrades. Furthermore, off-balance sheet funds plunged by 10.6% as the focus was on 
strengthening the deposit volume by customers. These negative effects offset the positive impact 
of the outstanding climb in customer deposits (from € 25,447 mn to € 30,819 mn). 
 In the last year (2011), the customer funds followed the trend, dropping by 2.9%. Debt 
securities went down by 20% and off-balance sheet funds contracted by 19.8% (due to a 
reduction of the asset management and bancassurance inflows.   
 Thus, there is no surprise the fall of both 
international customer funds by 7% y-o-y in 
2011, after the sharp decrease in 2010 (-34%) 
and domestic funds by 2% y-o-y. On a relative 
basis, international activity represented 22% of 
the total customer funds, while the domestic 
activity accounted for 78%. 
 In respect to the loan portfolio, the rise 
has been slowing since 2010 due to the 
deleverage process as mentioned before. The 
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, the recessionary conditions of the Portuguese economy and the 
financial aid programme contributed to stricter banking policies. Throughout 2011, BES group 
was concentrated on the disposal of non-core international loan portfolios such as project 
finance, an attempt to protect the corporate sector from a sharper reduction in loan granting, 




2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Linear Trend Bar Chart P & L
Net Income Attributable to Shareholders 607 402 522 511 -109
Domestic 466 259 343 307 -270
In % 77% 64% 66% 60% 248%
International 142 143 179 204 161
In % 23% 36% 34% 40% -148%
2. Profitability 
Throughout the years, the return on 
common equity (ROCE) has been suffering a 
sharp decrease, starting from 13.3% to end up 
with -1.4% in 2011. The negative return in last 
year can be justified by the extraordinary 
charges (pension obligations), by the 
additional impairments and finally by the 
special tax on banks. 
Notwithstanding, the one-off charges 
exclusion would imply a net income 
attributable to shareholders of € 167 mn, 
which increases ROCE to 3.2% and a ROA to 0.2%. 
Interestingly, even though domestic net income has been holding the highest share over 
time, in the recent period the process is reversing. Hence, since 2010 the domestic market went 
upside down in contrast with the international net income, which soared impressively. This 
event gives us the hint that emerging economies will be of higher importance for a sustainable 
profitability in the near future, especially two of the strategic triangle: Angola and Brazil. 
3. Liquidity 
There were two points in time where 
BES remained in the lending position: both in 
2007 and 2009. First, in 2007, one of the 
main concerns of the group was based on 
diversifying its funding sources, giving a 
special focus to medium and long term debt 
financing. Otherwise, the short term liquidity 
surplus would be a mirage and difficult to 
reach. 
Exhibit 20 - BES Profitability (in % and € mn) 
Source: BES Financials & own calculations 
Exhibit 22 – BES use of ECB liquidity facilities and 
repoable securities (in € bn) 
Source: BES annual reports 
Exhibit 21 - Evolution of net income attributable to shareholders by area (in € mn and %) 
Source: BES Financials & own calculations 
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As for 2009, the liquidity gap minus the liquidity buffer corresponded to € - 1.8 bn), 
providing short term liquidity whenever the bank decides to increase its commercial activity by 
grating loans at a higher pace than capturing fresh resources (customer funds). Saying that so, 
BES showed up as a net lender to ECB, whose amount could be applied to cover the 
reimbursement of the 2010 MLT debt (€ 5.1 bn). 
Last year, the used ECB liquidity facilities increased substantially, in which the outflows 
of € 9.6 bn (reimbursements of MLT debt) were not totally compensated by the reduction of the 
loan portfolio and the increase of deposits, adding up to € 4.8 bn. As a consequence, the use of 
ECB funds jumped to € 8.7 bn in 2011. 
 In terms of repoable securities, BES decided to maintain a good buffer by boosting the 
issue of covered bonds and bonds guaranteed by the State in 2011, therefore increasing the 
amount of collateral eligible for rediscount at ECB through the years. 
The portuguese financial system 
have been struggling to comply with a 
demanding balance sheet management in 
order to achieve a 120% loan-to-deposit 
ratio by 2014. BES is not the exception: it 
started the deleverage programme by the 
disposal of non-core loan portfolios and by 
the capture of new costumer deposits 
(fresh resources), as mentioned in 
subsection B, number 1. 
4. Asset Quality 
Despite the heavy corporate loan 
book (68% in 2011), the overdue loans ratio 
> 90 days of BES showed resilience not only 
in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, 
but also in the recent Eurozone sovereign 
debt crisis. 
Moreover, this ratio was consistently 
below the average of the Portuguese financial 
system, giving the emphasis BES holds a 
better asset quality than most of other big 
financial players. 
Exhibit 23  - The deleverage process on track by the 
transformation ratio 
Source: BES Financials & own calculations 
Exhibit 24 - The evolution of BES and the Portuguese 
financial system's overdue and doubtful loans (in %) 
Data as of November 2011 




 An austere monitoring of the asset 
quality aligned with the reinforcement of credit 
provisions is evidenced, accounting for 4.2% of 
the gross loans. BES anticipated the 
deterioration of macro conditions and its credit 
portfolio by committing itself to a higher 
provisioning coverage as it was the case of 
2009, for instance. In Q2 2009 and Q4 2009, an 
extra € 40 mn and € 66 mn of the gross capital 
gain90 on the sale of 24% of BES Angola was 
completed, respectively. 
Traditionally, the coverage of non-
performing loans over 90 days surpasses 100% 
comfortably. Albeit the good result, it is notorious 
the coverage diminishes insofar as overdue & 





Generally speaking, operating costs 
were under control (CAGR =4.4%), an effect 
caused by a rationalization policy, even 
though in 2010 it was witnessed an upward 
leap. 
The rise in cost-to-income ratio in 
2008 from 48% to 53% embraced the 
amortization of actuarial differences from 
pension obligations (+€ 15 mn in staff 
costs), the expansion of the international market and the raise in domestic branch network. 
Although operating costs soared in 2009 by 5.4%, the increase by 29.7% of banking 
income more than compensated the negative effect in P&L statement. Again, the lung of those 
costs was the accrual deviation implied by post-employment benefits. 
                                                          
90 The gross capital gain reported at the time was € 191 mn. 
Exhibit 25 - BES on balance sheet provisions reserve (in 
€ mn and % of gross loans) 
Source: BES Financials 
Exhibit 26 – Non performing loans coverage and 
overdue loans >90 days ratio 
Source: BES Financials & own calculations 
Exhibit 27 - Efficiency diagnosis 
Source: BES Financials 
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2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Staff Costs 411 418 441 467 395
Administrative Costs 317 335 321 340 317
Depreciation 58 65 71 80 82
Total 785 817 834 887 794
Growth (%) - 4,02% 2,08% 6,34% -10,50%
Banking income 1.608 1.436 1.813 1.630 1.212
Cost : income ratio 48,8% 56,9% 46,0% 54,4% 65,5%
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Staff Costs 92 104 125 162 192
Administrative Costs 62 68 81 101 117
Depreciation 12 13 16 21 26
Total 166 185 222 283 336
Growth (%) - 11,72% 19,85% 27,66% 18,66%
Banking income 393 452 637 774 738
Cost : income ratio 42,1% 40,9% 34,8% 36,6% 45,5%
International Area
Domestic Area
Treasury Bills Bonds Total
Portugal 1.545 1.399 2.944
Ireland 0 0 0
Greece 0 0 0
Italy 0 0 0
Spain 0 4 4
Total 1.545 1.403 2.948
A year after, banking income ascertained a slight reduction of 2% aligned with the 
worsening of the staff costs impelled by the transfer of the employees for the Social Security 
System (+ € 6 mn). 
Lately, operation costs seemed to emphasize the capacity of the bank to rationalize them, 
nevertheless cost:income ratio was fustigated by a drastic fall in banking income (-18.9%). 
 Breaking it by geographical 
area, there is an increasing move of 
the international operating costs due 
to the expansion overseas, namely the 
consolidation of new units of 
Execution Noble91. 
  In the national outlook, 
operating costs diminished, however 
the drop in banking income 
jeopardised cost:income, accounting for 65.5%.  
 Hence, it is not expected a high-volatile cost structure for both scenarios, plus in the near 
future consolidated banking income will tend to grow. In that sense, cost:income ratio will 
reverse to an acceptable one (around 50%), mitigating the downward trend of the Portuguese 
banking income. 
6. Solvency 
a) European Sovereign Exposure 
 
Concerning the strengthening of the capital 
ratios, the European sovereign exposure amounts to € 
2,948 mn and is mainly concentrated on the Portuguese 
short term debt (74% matures within 1 year) – 
Appendix 9. The accounting of total potential losses of 
European sovereign debt adds up to € 124 mn, which 
impacts core tier I on 19 basis points as of December 
2011.  
                                                          
91 Espírito Santo Investment Bank acquired 50.1% in Execution Noble, a leading international investment 
banking group. 
Exhibit 28 - Operating costs by area (mn euros and %) 
Source: BES Financials 
Exhibit 29 - European sovereign exposure 
(in € mn) 





Month April December April
Type of Operation
Incorporation of Reserves 
Rights Issue
Exchange Offer Rights Issue
Capital Increase € 1,200 mn € 530 mn € 1,010 mn
Share Capital € 3,500 mn € 4,030 mn € 5,040 mn
Offering Price € 1.8 € 1.8 € 0.395
Rights Issue 4/3 7/4
Price Ex-Rights € 3.42 € 0.588
Value of the right € 2.17 € 0.3377
# Subordinated Bonds Issued (Par Value = € 100) 81,736
# Shares Issued 666,666,666 294,573,418 2,555,688,388
# Total Shares 1,166,666,666 1,461,240,084 4,016,928,472
Core Tier 1 8.0% 9.2%
10.53%                                       




Ultimately BES has been striving to improve its solvency ratios. On April 2009, BES 
increased its share capital by three stages: 
a) The nominal value per share had plunged from € 5 to € 1, so that raise in capital would 
succeed taking into account market conditions; Hereby, share capital was reduced from 
€ 2500 mn to € 500 mn, and the remaining € 2000 mn were transferred to a special 
reserve; 
b) Issuance of 666,67 mn new shares at € 1 nominal value through public subscription and 
a rights issue, totalling 1666,67 mn shares; 
c) Rise in capital by incorporation of reserves through an increase in nominal value per 
share (€ 3), adding up the share premium. 
On December 2011, BES received new contributions in kind through an exchange offer of 
securities issued by BES, Espírito Santo Investment Bank and BES Finance. As a consequence of 
that offer, 294,573,418 common shares and 81,736 subordinated bonds at par (€ 100) were 
issued to comply with the capital requirements of BoP92. 
In addition, BES announced on May 4 2012 the total subscription of the capital increase 
of € 1,010 mn through. Hence, the bank issued 2,556,688,387 ordinary shares at an offering 
price of € 0.395. Most of the investors exercised their rights (99.3%), in which they had the right 
to pay at discount 1.75 shares more, for each old share held and the remaining amount was 
fulfilled by supplementary orders.  
The bank plans to acquire 50% of the insurer BES Vida for € 225 mn to the French bank 
Crédit Agricole by the proceeds of the right issue. The capital raise and the sale of BES Vida will 
reinforce Core Tier 1 to 10.53%, well above the minimum stipulated by the BoP93. Fortunately, 
                                                          
92 Bank of Portugal requires 9% by the end of December 2011. 
93 Bank of Portugal requires 10% by the end of December 2012. 
Exhibit 30 - Capital Increase description and core tier 1 ratio 




2012 E 2013 E 2014 E 2015 E 2016 E
Domestic Area Portugal -2,73% 8,25% 9,50% 6,48% 7,17%
Angola 25,96% -0,30% -5,36% -11,41% -11,22%
Brazil -4,13% 6,70% 8,38% 8,27% 8,45%
Spain -5,51% 1,78% 3,24% 3,69% 4,53%
United Kingdom 2,88% 13,64% 11,93% 13,41% 10,34%
Others *
Cape Verde -4,43% 15,56% 15,04% 3,76% 10,85%
Libya 317,26% 44,46% -7,95% -4,13% -5,11%
Mozambique -1,01% 23,14% 17,23% 16,43% 19,89%
USA 5,04% 9,23% 9,03% 9,80% 8,18%
France 0,78% 4,46% 5,99% 5,12% 5,25%
Customer Deposits Growth 8,2% 3,5% 2,7% 1,1% 1,8%
Adjustment 1% -6% -6% -5% -5%




the raise of capital among shareholders will avoid reliance on a € 12 bn state fund for banking 
recapitalization included in Portugal’s € 78 bn financial aid agreed with the EU, ECB and IMF. 
Throughout the years, BES has been striving to increase the capital standards by 
engaging on better capital (core capital) and reducing the risk on its assets. 
IV. Valuation Methodology 
A. Valuation Structure 
BES group was evaluated by four different approaches: Dupont analysis, Excess return 
model – Damodaran, Equity free cash flow and finally relative valuation. The purpose of this 
research was to look at the bank’s business and understand how each geographical area was 
creating value for its stakeholders. Hereby, I decided to split up the business into two different 
core areas: domestic and international. 
B. Valuation Assumptions 
1. Core items forecast – Liability side of the balance sheet 
a) Customer deposits  
Apart from loans-to-deposit ratio, deposits estimation was essential to derive loans and 
advances to customers and gross loans. In the first case, I found the change in gross national 
savings per year, in relative terms, the key word to estimate a pattern for customer deposits. 
The domestic outlook is represented by Portugal and the international is mainly 
composed by the emerging markets such as Angola and Brazil and other countries relevant for 
the business. Afterwards, I came up with an average of customer funds from 2008 to 2011 for 
each geographical area, so that the relative change in Portugal would definitely be the number 
one driver, followed by the international arena. 
Exhibit 31 – Customer deposits forecast 
Source: IMF Database, own calculations 
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In BES  year-end 2011 conference call, the chairman Ricardo Espirito Santo stressed out 
the deposits in Portugal was showing an upward trend (8.3% y-o-y in November), a proof of 
depositors confidence in the Portuguese banking system. In this sense, I made an adjustment to 
the initial weight computed to reflect more closely the behaviour of customer deposits in 2012 
by 100 basis points.  
Later on, it did not seem feasible to keep the same rate as I believed the growth would 
slow down heavily, therefore I established an adjustment of minus 600 basis points for both 
2013, 2014 and minus 500 basis points for 2015 and 2016.  
The rationale behind it was that deposits growth will probably saturate in the near 
future, a reminiscent that unsustainable growth rates will not be set in the medium/long term 
horizon. The attempt to raise the deposit base made depositors require a lift in deposit margin. 
Bank of Portugal introduced tighter rules to manage this scale-up by penalizing in early 
November the remuneration of deposits beyond 300 basis points + Euribor rate (Commission, 
Winter 2011/2012)94. Nevertheless, in absolute terms, it will increase year-on-year - see 
appendix 10. 
b) Deposits from central banks 
BES group was fatally exposed to the usage of ECB liquidity facilities. It had been the last 
resource for the Portuguese banking system’ funding that allowed to reimburse maturities and 
manage liquidity during this sluggish period. The accessibility to the wholesale debt markets is 
practically forbidden due to an increasing spread of the Portuguese treasury bonds’ credit 
default swaps in contrast to the Germany’s bund, giving us the hint Portugal is facing a higher 
risk of default. On May 24 2012, the CDS of the 5-year national treasury bonds was being traded 
at 1,231.69 basis points95. This indicates the investor has to pay annually € 1,231.69 thousand to 
insure himself/herself for each € 10 mn invested in the sovereign debt.  
As a consequence, BES has been highly penalized by the systematic sovereign notch cuts 
administrated by the rating agencies, in which its business has been intrinsically connected to 
the ability of the country to capitalize through the wholesale markets. 
Whereas, we should bear in mind the dependency to the ECB funding resources has to be 
reduced drastically, otherwise the Eurosystem is being put at risk in spite of the substantial raise 
of ECB’s eligible collaterals. 
                                                          
94 Commission, E. (Winter 2011/2012). The economic adjustment programme for Portugal, pp. 12. 
95 Bloomberg on 24 May 2012. 
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 E 2013 E 2014 E 2015 E 2016 E
Deposits from central banks (DCB) 14.407 19.419 48.788 50.774 30.245 33.161 36.971 41.184 45.647
Deposits - BES 4.810 3.818 7.965 10.014 8.022 6.632 5.546 4.118 4.565
% of DCB 33,39% 19,66% 16,33% 19,72% 26,52% 20,00% 15,00% 10,00% 10,00%
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 E 2013 E 2014 E 2015 E 2016 E
Resources from other credit institutions - BP (DOCI) 74.415 74.370 81.040 74.455 77.029 81.070 86.352 92.192 98.379
Deposits from banks - BES 7.682 6.896 6.381 6.239 6.260 6.588 7.018 7.492 7.995
% of DOCI 10,32% 9,27% 7,87% 8,38% 8,13% 8,13% 8,13% 8,13% 8,13%
2012 E 2013 E 2014 E 2015 E 2016 E
Debt securities issued ( exc. matured securities) 12.006 9.466 6.684 4.927 4.721
(+) 0 - 12 monthly securities per year 6.800 9.718 12.637 15.556 15.556
Total debt securities issued 18.805 19.185 19.322 20.484 20.278
Concerning these limitations, I attempted to estimate deposits from central banks 
through a linear regression between the Euro area GDP at current prices and deposits from 
central banks reported in Bank of Portugal for the time horizon beginning in 2000 and ending up 
in 2011 – see appendix 11. Later, I checked the weight of these deposits in BES balance sheet 
against the total amount of deposits from central banks.  
For 2012 I computed a 2008-2009 average, yielding a high percentage to mirror the 
dependency on ECB’s liquidity facilities. In the subsequent years, the target weight should 
plunge 5 p.p. starting from 20% in 2013 and drawing to a 10% close in 2016.  
c) Claims at other credit institutions  
The strategy adopted to reckon on resources from other credit institutions stemmed 
from the same reasoning as the one stated right above in practical terms. The only difference to 
highlight is the 2010-2011 average, in which BES deposits were computed by multiplying it with 
the total resources from other credit institutions. 
Undoubtedly, as long as the confidence in the financial system is restored, the tendency 
to a growing amount of these specific deposits is underway, generating liquidity to finance the 
economy. 
d) Debt securities issued 
The seize of debt securities consisted of starting from the 2011 value (€ 18,453 mn) and 
excluding all the debt instruments that were going to mature in each year. After that, the next 
thing to think of was the issuance of the 0 – 12 monthly securities per year to achieve an 
aggregate figure for this item.  
In respect to the later, the year 2012 deemed an equivalent amount as the one from 
2011, foreseeing a copycat behaviour, but further on I figured out that a 2008 – 2011 average 
Exhibit 32 – Deposits from central banks forecast (in € mn) 
Source: IMF Database, Bank of Portugal, BES annual reports & own calculations 
Exhibit 33 – Resources from other credit institutions forecast (in € mn) 
Source: IMF Database, Bank of Portugal, BES annual reports & own calculations 
Exhibit 34 – Debt securities issued forecast (in € mn) 
Source: BES 2011 annual report & own calculations 
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would be trustworthy to evidence a recovery. Then, the performance in 2014 and 2015 followed 
the yearly change depicted between 2012 and 2013 years, while in 2016 it equalled to the 
previous year. 
In the subsection deposits from central banks, I pointed out the emergency of a 
downward ECB funding to protect the Eurosystem as the counterpart of higher access to the 
debt wholesale markets to run the business in a healthier mode. 
In effect, the drop in deposits from central banks should be partially compensated by the 
increase in debt securities issued, although at a slow pace due to abnormal interest rates to hold 
national sovereign debt and the national risk of default/credit event. 
e) Subordinated debt 
For a better comprehension of the 
developments in subordinated debt I 
referred to its maturity profile from 2012 
to 2015. As a matter of fact, the expected 
amount to be reimbursed in 2012 was 
about € 31 mn. In the following years it 
was not foreseen any relevant matured 
subordinated instruments, whilst in 2015 
it was reported a heavy amount of € 194 
mn. 
In that sense, I deducted these reimbursements from 2011 subordinated debt, meaning 
that in 2012 - 2014 the outcome would be minus € 31 mn and in 2015 – 2016 would be minus € 
225 mn. 
2. Core items forecast – Asset side of the balance sheet 
a) Gross loans 
Gross loans takes into account three components: loans & advances to banks, loans & 
advances to customers and provisions. The estimation of total deposits (deposits from central 
banks and other credit institutions, customer deposits) was suitable to multiply them with total 
loan-to-deposit ratio in order to set the results for gross loans. 
In general, the deleverage programme caused substantial effects in the way I should 
perceive loan granting. The total transformation ratio96 should not exceed the percentage of 
2011 (108%) – see appendix 10, instead it should drop drastically to signal a lower banking 
                                                          
96 The same as total loan-to-deposit ratio. 
Exhibit 35 – Subordinated debt maturity profile (in € mn) 
Source: BES annual report (2011) 
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lending to households and SMEs without jeopardising exporting companies that attempt to seize 
market share in emerging economies. 
Thus, the decreasing amount of gross loans in the financial years 2012 and 2013 can be 
justified by a fall in total transformation ratio – see appendix 10. To align the business with a 
recovery environment in the near future, I was pragmatically careful to reverse the previous 
trend by committing to a turning point in the overall banking lending.  
In the next five years, my expectation rely on the possibility of the loan granting being 
somewhere between 2010 and 2011 results – see appendix 10. 
b) Customer loans 
The specification of customer deposits was necessary to provide the amounts for 
customer loans. Indeed, in 2012 I decreased the customer loan-to-deposit ratio to 130% and 
from that moment onwards I complied with the 120% target ratio. The deleverage programme 
was adopted since the second half of 2010, reaching in 2011 a loan-to-deposit ratio of 143%. 
Despite the strong balance sheet deleverage, BES was showing selectivity in loan granting, 
insofar the bank did not despise its strategic positioning – support exporting Portuguese 
companies that aim to gain market share in the international outlook. 
In 2012 and 2013 I forecasted a reduction of € -917 mn and € -2,159 mn, respectively, 
however the recovery process would start from that moment onwards to fund the small and 
medium enterprises (exporting & non-exporting companies) and the households, achieving € 
48,607 mn in 2016, an amount below the one reported in the last financial year (2011) – see 
appendix 10. 
c) Loans and advances to banks 
This asset was entitled to be processed through the deduction of customer loans and 
provisions to the total amount of gross loans. In the medium/long term it is fair enough to 
assume a gradual soar in the interbank lending market, whereupon BES would arrange more 
liquidity facilities to lend to other credit institutions – see appendix 10.  
Loan exchange would definitely improve the funding conditions of the economy. That is, 
the growth in the interbank lending market leads to greater private/public consumption and 
puts in place more funding resources to SMEs seeking to finance their business and future 
investments. Hence, GDP would report an satisfactory result in the domestic outlook. 
d) Cash and deposits at central banks 
The ECB press release of December 8 2011 set the minimum reserves to 1% for periods 
starting on 18 January 2012. It stresses out that overnight deposits, deposits with agreed 
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 E 2013 E 2014 E 2015 E 2016 E
Deposits from central banks 4.810 3.818 7.965 10.014 8.022 6.632 5.546 4.118 4.565
0 - 12 Months 4.810 3.818 7.965 5.012 4.016 3.320 2.776 2.061 2.285
% of Deposits from central banks 100% 100% 100% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50%
Deposits from banks 7.682 6.896 6.381 6.239 6.260 6.588 7.018 7.492 7.995
0 - 12 Months 5.247 5.058 3.834 3.647 4.072 4.286 4.565 4.874 5.201
% of Deposits from banks 68% 73% 60% 58% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65%
Due to customers 26.387 25.446 30.819 34.206 37.020 38.306 39.352 39.789 40.506
0 - 12 Months 15.993 16.117 17.372 20.867 22.334 23.110 23.741 24.004 24.437
% of Due to customers 61% 63% 56% 61% 60% 60% 60% 60% 60%
Debt securities issued 24.597 33.101 24.110 18.453 18.805 19.185 19.322 20.484 20.278
0 - 12 Months 8.407 15.254 8.413 6.800 7.146 7.290 7.343 7.784 7.706
% of Debt securities issued 34% 46% 35% 37% 38% 38% 38% 38% 38%
Minimum reserves Requirement 751 760 768 774 793
In % 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
maturity or period notice up to two years, debt securities issued with maturity up two years and 
money market paper has a coefficient of 1%. 
The remaining liabilities with maturity over two years do not fulfil the requirements. 
The below table depicts the breakdown of the main components to calculate the 
reserves. Back in time, the coefficient ratio corresponded to 2% of the above liabilities, excluding 
all the deposits and debt certificates subject to ECB’s minimum reserves requirements (BES, 
2011)97. 
Although I had said right before the maturity would be up to two years, BES financial 
statements’ notes did only display the results up to three months, three to twelve months and 
one year to five years. In view of that, I only considered the amounts maturing up to twelve 
months. 
Then, I ascertained the weight of these short term liabilities over its respective total 
amount. Regarding deposits from central banks, I established a ratio equivalent to 2011 for the 
next years. In fact, BES group took advantage of a three year LTRO98 from ECB both in December 
2011 and February 2012, adding up to € 10,200 mn to ensure funding for the following three 
years (BES, Q1 2012). 
Given that this operation holds a massive position in deposits from central banks, it 
made sense to keep the 50% ratio. To the rest of the liabilities I adopted a fixed average. 
Likewise, I assumed total reserves would rely on 1% to fulfil Bank of Portugal 
requirements and 1% more for the European system of central banks, accounting for an overall 
2%. 
                                                          
97 BES. (2011). Annual report.  
98 Long term refinancing operations. 
Exhibit 36 – Decomposition of minimum reserves forecast (in € mn) 
Source: BES annual reports, IMF Database, Bank of Portugal & own calculations 
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 E 2013 E 2014 E 2015 E 2016 E
Gross loans 52.730 58.529 56.852 54.493 53.868 51.527 52.954 53.456 55.188
Provisions (BS) 1.148 1.552 1.777 2.167 2.321 2.216 2.100 1.900 1.737
Overdue loans 1.161 1.704 2.134 2.949 2.915 2.788 2.648 2.406 2.208
e) Provisions 
One of the most relevant ratios to observe is the overdue loans99 over the gross loans. 
Given that gross loans were already estimated by the methodology carried out in subsection 
valuation assumptions, 2., a) I found out that in 2011 the ratio was about 5.4% - see appendix 
11.  
In the subsequent two years, I kept the ratio at the same level which provoked a level off 
in 2012 and a decrease in 2013 of overdue loans to be in accordance with market expectations 
for the very immediate moment – see appendix 11. 
From 2013 onwards, I submitted a ratio of 5%, 4.5% and 4% to illustrate the ability of 
the households and SMEs to cancel out their obligations, which smooths out overdue loans over 
time – see appendix 11. 
Do not be fooled by the great amount of overdue loans in comparison with balance sheet 
provisions. In fact, if you slip non performing loans up into overdue loans 30+ days and 90+ 
days, the coverage of these overdue loans exceeds by far 100%. 
Starting from 2000 and ending up in 2011 I made a linear regression between balance 
sheet provisions and overdue loans to understand how they relate to each other, mathematically 
speaking. 
During 2012, the recessionary environment for Portugal will foster the placement of 
credit impairments, in which Eurostat estimates a -3.3% decrease in real GDP growth rate. 
Nevertheless, the next year projections display a slight raise of 0.3%, whereupon I came across 
to think it would be viable to slow down impairments in the balance sheet for the subsequent 
years (IMF, 2012). 
In the first quarter of 2012, BES group reinforced credit impairments to € 2,271.2 mn, an 
increase of € 103.8 mn from 2011 financial year (BES, Q1 2012). 
f) Securities  
By scrolling down the notes in the consolidated financial statements, I figured out the 
below items in the asset side of the balance sheet had something in common: bonds & other 
fixed income securities and shares.  
                                                          
99 Overdue loans (30+ and 90+ days). 
Exhibit 37 – Provisions forecast (in € mn) 
Source: BES Financials & own calculations 
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 E 2013 E 2014 E 2015 E 2016 E
Securities 15.106 16.535 19.600 18.423 16.900 16.223 16.636 16.781 17.282
Financial assets held for trading 3.690 4.459 3.942 3.435 3.751 3.584 3.595 3.610 3.789
% of securities 24% 27% 20% 19% 22% 22% 22% 22% 22%
Other financial assets at fair value through profit or loss 2.162 1.002 1.424 1.964 1.618 1.361 1.493 1.577 1.570
% of securities 14% 6% 7% 11% 10% 8% 9% 9% 9%
Available-for-sale financial assets 7.094 8.532 11.775 11.483 9.336 9.298 9.772 9.801 9.924
% of securities 47% 52% 60% 62% 55% 57% 59% 58% 57%
Held-to-maturity investments 2.160 2.542 2.459 1.541 2.137 1.984 1.904 1.875 2.052
% of securities 14% 15% 13% 8% 13% 12% 11% 11% 12%
Loans 52.730 58.529 56.852 54.493 53.868 51.527 52.954 53.456 55.188
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 E 2013 E 2014 E 2015 E 2016 E
Derivatives for risk management purposes 936 455 447 510 501 604 939 950 967
Hedged assets 598 292 256 210 206 274 600 607 618
% of total 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Risk management - assets 338 163 191 300 295 330 339 343 349
% of total 1% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Deposits at banks 664 611 558 581 628 638 651 666 682
Loans and advances to customers 47.049 48.979 50.829 49.043 48.126 45.968 47.223 47.747 48.607
Total 47.714 49.589 51.387 49.624 48.754 46.606 47.874 48.413 49.289
Hereby, I dared to see what would be the relation between each variable and the core 
item in the balance sheet (gross loans) by computing further on the moving average of that 
weight. Overall speaking, due to securities risky profile and BES risk aversion I foresee a 
downside trend coming to an end in 2013. The Eurostat database suggests the real GDP growth 
rate in EU 27 will be null, followed by a jump in 2013 of 1.3%, which emphasizes the confidence 
is riskier financial instruments will be on track.  
g) Derivatives for risk management purposes 
Derivatives for risk management purposes include the “hedging derivatives and 
derivatives to manage the risk of certain financial assets/liabilities” (BES annual report, 2011). 
Most of the time, the hedging derivatives and other derivatives “on the table” were usually 
interest rate swaps, credit default swaps, equity swaps, forex swaps, etc. to cover potential 
downside risks. 
Frequently, the financial assets to be hedged were deposits at banks and loans & 
advances to customers, which is of the uttermost importance since you never know with 100% 
accuracy whether the borrowers will pay you the principal plus interest or not. 
Therefore, I added up these two items to come up with a percentage measure for both 
categories (hedged assets and other derivatives). Regarding the time horizon, the weight for 
hedged assets and other derivatives in 2012 was similar to 2011 and later on I assumed 2008 
percentage (1%).  
Exhibit 38 – Breakdown of securities forecast (in € mn) 
Source: BES annual reports & own calculations 
Exhibit 39 – Derivatives for risk management purposes forecast (in € mn) 




2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 E 2013 E 2014 E 2015 E 2016 E
Claims at other credit institutions - BP 34.422 43.274 35.109 34.751 38.024 38.647 39.462 40.362 41.316
Deposits with banks - BES 664 611 558 581 628 638 651 666 682
% of claims - BP 1,93% 1,41% 1,59% 1,67% 1,65% 1,65% 1,65% 1,65% 1,65%
2012 E 2013 E 2014 E 2015 E 2016 E
Euribor forward 3 M 0,05% 0,33% 0,68% 1,34% 2,03%
Loans and advances 51.547 49.310 50.853 51.555 53.451
Yield 4,15% 4,63% 4,88% 5,54% 6,13%
Revenues 2.141 2.283 2.483 2.858 3.276
Margin 4,1% 4,3% 4,2% 4,2% 4,1%
Other assets 14.220 13.885 14.760 14.869 15.195
Yield 3,51% 3,79% 4,14% 4,80% 5,49%
Revenues 500 526 611 714 834
Margin 3,5% 3,5% 3,5% 3,5% 3,5%
IEA 65.767 63.196 65.613 66.425 68.647
Yield 4,01% 4,45% 4,72% 5,38% 5,99%
Revenues 2.640 2.809 3.094 3.573 4.110
Due to customers 37.020 38.306 39.352 39.789 40.506
Yield 2,05% 2,33% 2,68% 3,24% 3,83%
Costs 760 893 1.056 1.291 1.551
Margin 2,0% 2,0% 2,0% 1,9% 1,8%
Other liabilities 34.267 33.592 33.079 33.102 33.849
Yield 2,28% 2,56% 2,78% 3,34% 3,93%
Costs 782 860 920 1107 1330
Margin 2,2% 2,2% 2,1% 2,0% 1,9%
IEL 71.287 71.898 72.431 72.891 74.355
Yield 2,16% 2,44% 2,73% 3,29% 3,87%
Costs 1.542 1.753 1.976 2.398 2.881
Net Interest Income 1.098 1.057 1.118 1.175 1.229
Net interest margin (NII/IEA) 1,67% 1,67% 1,70% 1,77% 1,79%
The argument holds if we are aware that risk-weighted assets should improve, causing 
not only the trading book to fall down, but also an upward leap in the core tier 1 ratio to comply 
with the regulatory standards in 2012. Nevertheless, as BES gets better capitalized through 
capital increases we could presume the bank will take on more risk in its trading portfolio. 
h) Deposits with banks 
Along with deposits from central banks and other credit institutions, I looked into the 
future by computing a linear regression between the total euro area GDP at current prices and 
deposits with banks provided by Bank of Portugal database – see appendix 11. The arithmetic 
average from 2008 to 2011 was applied, contributing to a soar in BES deposits with banks at a 
slow pace throughout the time line. 
We should bear in mind that BES will not benefit from a dominant liquidity surplus to 
save heavily its resources in other credit institutions. 
3. Core items forecast – income statement 
a) Net interest income 
Alongside fees and 
commissions (net non-
interest income), net interest 
income is also a significant 
item of a banking P&L 
statement.  
To understand 
whether a careful 
asset/liability management 
is on track, first you give a 
look at interest earning 
assets and see the revenues yielded, in which yield is expressed as Euribor forward three 
months plus credit margin; second, you ascertain interest earning liabilities and have a look at 
the costs yielded, measured by Euribor forward three months plus deposit margin100. 
                                                          
100 Deposit margin is negative as it represents a cost for the bank. 
Exhibit 40 – Deposits with banks forecast (in € mn) 
Source: IMF Database, Bank of Portugal, BES annual reports & own calculations 
Exhibit 41 – Net interest income forecast (in € mn) 
Source: BES annual reports & own calculations 
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The yield curve - the term structure of interest rates is estimated by zero-coupon yield 
curves and I used it to derive implied three month forward rates. According to Bodie, Kane & 
Marcus (2009), the forward interest rate is a “rate of interest for a future period that would 
equate the total return of a long-term bond with that of a strategy of rolling over shorter-term 
bonds”. 
As a matter of fact, it can be defined by the following equation: 
      
          
           
in which    is the yield to maturity of a zero-coupon bond with an n-period maturity,      is the 
same but with an (n-1) period maturity and    is the forward interest rate for an n-period. 
John Y. Campbell101 states “the 
forward curve lies above the yield 
curve when the yield curve is upward-
sloping and below it when the yield 
curve is downward-sloping”. 
The slope of the yield curve 
defines the direction of future short-
term interest rates. In our specific case, this upward-sloping indicates that financial markets 
expect higher future interest rates – see appendix 12. 
The 3-M forward rates from 2012 to 2016 were 0.05%, 0.33%, 0.68%, 1.34% and 2.03%, 
respectively – see appendix 13. 
In what concerns the projections for credit margin I increased from 3.8% in 2011 to 
4.1% in 2012 to protect a net interest margin of 1.67% achieved in the last financial year, whilst 
deposit margin would be stuck at the same level (2%) – see exhibit 40. The reason behind it 
relates to the need for compensation of a lower banking lending to households and SMEs. 
In 2013, the line of reasoning stuck with the same principle as in 2012, attempting to 
maintain a net interest margin of 1.67% since I believe lending would suffer another shortfall – 
see exhibit 40.  
In the upcoming years, the trend would go along with a slight drop in deposit margin, 
followed by a minor decrease in credit margin, however expecting higher net interest margin as 
loan growth accelerates to finance the economy – see exhibit 40. 
                                                          
101 Campbell, J. Y. (Summer 1995). Some lessons from the yield curve. The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 129-152.  
 
Exhibit 42 – The yield and forward curves 
Source: ECB & own calculations 
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The individual balance sheet deems Banco Espírito Santo, S.A., a commercial bank 
headquartered in Portugal employed to assess the domestic outlook. I checked the figures of 
loans & advances, and other assets to compute the weight over its consolidated outcome to 
decide how much million euros I would allocate for these items in the future. 
Both 2010 and 2011 presented similar net interest margins (1.01% and 1.02%, 
respectively), whereupon I deliberated the ratio in 2012 would be equal as in 2011, rising in the 
upcoming years by 0.01%. Thereby, domestic net interest income was determined by the 
multiplying of domestic net interest margin and domestic interest earning assets – see 
appendix 14. 
The international figures were obtained by deducting the domestic net interest income 
from the consolidated one.  
Generally speaking, my reasoning comprises the idea both domestic and international 
net interest income will plunge from 2011102 to 2013, recovering in the following years as credit 
lending gets back on the market. 
b) Fees and commissions 
Fees and commissions is the second most relevant item in P&L and it is also known as 
non-interest income. To estimate it I was interested in the historical performance of each 
category over interest earning assets – see appendix 15. Then, I kept the historical average in 
the future to see the contribution of each category in the whole amount of fees and commissions. 
Forsooth, what stands out is that the slowdown in banking lending leads mainly 
commissions on loans and trade finance & other exports related (includes documentary credit) 
to a sharp reduction from 2012 to 2013. In the last next three years, loan related fees will 
probably get back to a normal record – see appendix 15. 
Moreover, asset management and bancassurance fees also plunge in 2012, revealing 
automatically the customers’ risk aversion, i.e., preference for low-risk instruments such as 
deposits. Nevertheless, from 2013 onwards there are high prospects financial markets turmoil 
will reverse, making investors to seek riskier financial applications, which foster this class of 
fees – see appendix 15. 
Not only security related fees perform well thanks to the consolidation of Execution 
Noble, but also cards fees as BES announced a partnership with American Express to issue its 
branded cards in Portugal.  
                                                          




Shedding some light into geographical areas, I would point out that domestic fees will 
suffer in 2012 and 2013 in view of a lending shortage, recovering later on to fulfil 
macroeconomic dynamics. 
As for the international fees, it will only suffer in 2012 for the same reason as domestic 
fees, but in the upcoming years the consolidation of Execution Noble will bring many more 
benefits. 
c) Capital markets & other 
Capital markets & other expresses the movements in the equity and debt main price 
indices. Interest rate, credit & FX and equity trading stemmed from their weight in the overall 
securities portfolio – see appendix 16 and the subsection securities. 
In the latter one I assumed the ratio would correspond to the 2009-2010 average, 
whereas the first would be equal to 2011 ratio – see appendix 16. In fact, I am confident capital 
markets will be translated into the appreciation of those financial instruments whenever 
investors’ negative sentiment about sovereign public deficit in the Eurozone steps back.  
In the prior financial year, capital markets & other was highly impacted by the partial 
transfer of the pension funds to the Social Security, leading to a loss of € mn 107 after pension 
liabilities being valued at 4% discount rate from a 5% before the operation. 
Likewise, the loss in the sale of international loan book (€ 78 mn) and BES Vida 
impairments (€ 193.3 mn) were devastating.  
In respect to income from securities, BES holds a stake in EDP, Portugal Telecom and 
BMCE103  of 2.19%, 10.45% and 0.25%, respectively. Portugal Telecom’s dividend policy plan for 
2012-2014 consisted of a 3-4% raise in dividends, in which I preferred to assume it would be at 
least 3% in my calculations. EDP has been increasing dividends by € 0.015 per year since 2007, 
therefore I do not expect further changes. As for BMCE I took a defensive move by only 
considering each year the same dividend as in 2012 – see appendix 17. 
Other results were heavily influenced by potential gains/losses in available for sale 
portfolio. My behaviour was aligned with the need of testing the gap between the market value 
and the acquisition value. If                   , thus we report a potential loss, otherwise it 
is a potential gain – see appendix 18. 
The performance of PT shares punishes BES’ available for sale portfolio over time more 
than the remaining two. Moreover, I reinforced the negative value of 2012 by taking into account 
the loss in sale of international loan book (€ 78 mn as in 2011), the purchase of BES Vida by € 
                                                          
103 Banque Marocaine du commerce extérieur. 
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 E 2013 E 2014 E 2015 E 2016 E
Staff costs 521 566 582 587 565 578 601 619 633
Remuneration 403 416 466 472 477 488 503 520 537
Long term service benefits & other costs 6 3 4 1 1 1 4 4 4
Pension benefits (restated) 48 86 44 23 16 17 17 17 18
Other costs 65 61 68 93 72 73 76 78 75
o.w. domestic 418 441 420 395 373 381 390 403 405
% of staff costs 80% 78% 72% 67% 66% 66% 65% 65% 64%
o.w. international 103 125 162 192 192 196 210 217 228
% of staff costs 20% 22% 28% 33% 34% 34% 35% 35% 36%
225 mn and the impairments in BES Vida by € -0.2 mn (Q1 2012 reported figure). In the next 
year, I just consider the loss in sale of international loan portfolio to be in line with bank lending 
shortfall – see appendix 16. 
By analysing geographical particularities, domestic will be fustigated in 2012 on the 
verge of a spoiled Eurozone debt crisis – see appendix 16. Although BES does not possess any 
exposure to the Greek market, the exposure to Portugal and Spain can be translated into a 
massive lockdown in 2012. As opposed to it, international activities will attempt to show 
resilience, and be attentive of finding new sources of return outside Europe. 
In the forthcoming years, the prospects may lead to a significant improvement since 
Troika says Portugal will be able to regain access to the markets for financing in September 
2013 as scheduled. 
d) Operating cash costs 
Operating cash costs is composed by staff costs and administrative costs. 
Focusing on remuneration I determined 2012 would present a growth ratio equal to 
2011 (1.1%), 2013 would be 2.25% of actuarial assumptions and from 2014 onwards salaries 
would get back to 3.25% increase rate of 2010. 
Long term service benefits is applicable at the date of retirement or disability, as workers 
receive a premium proportional to the amount they would get as if they were at work. It is 
realistic to consider this benefit will remain constant in the following two years and start to 
grow in better market conditions. As it 
is known, banking system is cutting 
down superfluous prerogatives. 
In terms of the transfer of 
pension obligations to the Social 
Security, it added up to € 961 mn, of 
which € 529 mn were transferred until 
YE 2011 and the remaining € 432 mn 
would be transferred until June 2012 
Exhibit 43 – Staff costs forecast (in € mn) 
Source: BES Financials & own calculations 
Exhibit 44 – Pension liabilities transferred to Social Security 
and remaining post-employment benefits (in € mn). 
Source: BES 2011 Presentation 
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 E 2013 E 2014 E 2015 E 2016 E
Gross loans 52.730 58.529 56.852 54.493 53.868 51.527 52.954 53.456 55.188
Provisions (BS) 1.148 1.552 1.777 2.167 2.321 2.216 2.100 1.900 1.737
Overdue loans 1.161 1.704 2.134 2.949 2.915 2.788 2.648 2.406 2.208
Credit provisions/Reversal 275 540 352 601 154 -105 -116 -200 -164
Provisions - Domestic 628 936 1.141 1.523 1.631 1.382 1.392 1.269 1.168
% of total provisions (BS) 55% 60% 64% 70% 70% 62% 66% 67% 67%
Credit provisions/Reversal 199 387 259 538 108 -65 -77 -134 -110
Provisions - International 520 616 636 645 691 834 709 632 568
% of total provisions (BS) 45% 40% 36% 30% 30% 38% 34% 33% 33%
Credit provisions/Reversal 75 153 93 62 46 -39 -39 -66 -54
(BES presentation, 2011). 
Of the overall liabilities transferred, it is fair enough to mention BES supported a € 107 
mn loss due to the change of discount rate from 5.5% to 4%, whilst pension funds the remaining 
€ 854 mn. At the moment, post-employment benefits only represent around € 1,100 mn (BES 
presentation, 2011). 
Likewise, actuarial differences are now going to be recorded in other comprehensive 
income, crossing off the preceding corridor method. Before, the criteria consisted of amortising 
the actuarial gains/losses outside the corridor over a fifteen year period, while the ones within 
the corridor was not acknowledged in the income statement. 
To estimate pension benefits, I deemed what would be the costs without transferring the 
liabilities and how much costs were cut off from transferring to the Social Security. The 
difference between these two would represent the pension expenses for each year. The 
contribution rate is 26.6%, in which 23.6% is paid by BES and the remaining 3% by the 
employee.  
The international staff costs were computed by adding 1% more than 2011 figure, 
keeping constant for two years. The same procedure would be applied for the next years. 
Therefore, we would presume only a fall in 2012 for domestic outlook, whereas international 
outlook would definitely not drop thanks to Execution Noble consolidation and the pursuance of 
expansion strategy in emerging markets, mainly in strategic triangle. 
As for administrative expenses, I ascertained how much staff costs would account for in 
operating cash costs and the rest would go for this item to reach 100%. 
e) Loan impairments/Reversal of loan impairments 
The global amount of credit provisions or reversal of credit provisions was introduced by 
the absolute change y-o-y in balance sheet provisions. 
Exhibit 45 – Loan impairments/Reversal of loan impairments forecast 
Source: BES Financials & own calculations 
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 E 2013 E 2014 E 2015 E 2016 E
Core Tier 1 6,1% 8,0% 7,9% 9,2% 10,0% 10,0% 10,0% 10,0% 10,0%
Absolute Values 3.412 5.232 5.416 6.020 6.509 6.578 6.675 6.751 6.908
Total Assets 75.187 82.297 83.655 80.237 82.016 82.881 84.107 85.070 87.038
RWA 55.705 65.097 68.802 65.385 64.982 65.667 66.639 67.402 68.961
% of TA 74,1% 79,1% 82,2% 81,5% 79,2% 79,2% 79,2% 79,2% 79,2%
Tier I 3.946 5.405 6.040 6.171 6.133 6.198 6.289 6.361 6.509
% of RWA 7,1% 8,3% 8,8% 9,4% 9,4% 9,4% 9,4% 9,4% 9,4%
Tier II 2.327 1.851 1.802 858 853 862 874 884 905
% of RWA 4,2% 2,8% 2,6% 1,3% 1,3% 1,3% 1,3% 1,3% 1,3%
Liabilities 70.534 75.358 76.179 74.045 74.497 74.929 75.658 76.145 77.688
Due to customers 26.387 25.446 30.819 34.206 37.020 38.306 39.352 39.789 40.506
Off-balance sheet items 23.600 24.200 21.900 18.900 22.150 21.788 21.184 21.005 21.532
Special Tax on banks 15 15 15 15 15
To decipher how much would go to IS domestic/international credit provisions, I 
conferred its weight against provisions of the balance sheet from 2008 to 2011. Afterwards, I 
maintained the proportion in 2012 identical to YE 2011 and generated a moving average 
beginning in 2008 and finishing up in 2011. 
The composition of credit impairments/reversal of impairments is related to the future 
growth prospects of real GDP – see IV, B., 2., e). Thus, from 2013 onwards I pondered total 
balance sheet provisions would loosen up as it has been impacting negatively the consolidated 
net income. 
f) Income taxes and special tax on banks 
The definition of income taxes is in line with a nominal rate of 26.5%, in accordance with 
the Law No. 107-B/2003 from December 31 and Law No. 2/2007 of January 15. Also, a tax of 
2.5% is applicable in the scope of Programa de Estabilidade e Crescimento.  
In addition, the administrative rule No.121/2011 from March 30 states that in total 
liabilities (excluding Tier 1 & Tier 2 resources and all the deposits covered by Deposit Guarantee 
Fund) is applicable a tax of 0.05%; in relation to the off-balance sheet instruments a tax burden 
of 0.00015%. 
  
Exhibit 46 – Clearance of special tax on banks (in € mn) 
Source: Portuguese state gazette, BES Financials & own calculations 
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Portugal Angola Brazil Spain United Kingdom United States of America
Total assets 58.600 6.867 2.681 5.909 3.575 1.398
Total Assets Domestic/International 58.600
% of TA 34% 13% 29% 18% 7%
Total market risk premium 10,13% 10,88% 8,63% 7,28% 6,00% 6,00%
o.w. country risk premium 4,13% 4,88% 2,63% 1,28% 0,00% 0,00%
20.429
g) Net income 
 
From the graph, it is absolutely 
clear that international business will be as 
important as domestic business over time. 
The sluggish macroeconomic 
environment faced in Portugal will make 
BES to seek other growth opportunities 
overseas, especially in two of its strategic 
triangle – Angola and Brazil. 
 
C. Valuation Inputs 
The moment after discussing the key components of BES balance sheet and income 
statement is the right time to value the bank through four valuation approaches: Dupont 
analysis, adjusted excess return model104 – Damodaran, free cash flow to the equity and relative 
valuation. 
1. Dupont analysis 
According to this method, the equity of a financial institution is worth the resulting 
equation: 
                
              
            
 
, in which demanded ROE is estimated by CAPM, the forecasted ROE is ROA multiplied by the 
equity multiplier and net asset value is the value of equity striped of any pension fund shortfalls, 
tax credits that are going to end, unrealised capital gains/losses and lack of provisions. 
The above table was envisaged to balance the total market risk premium that contained 
exposure to Portugal (domestic area) and the most relevant international areas - Angola, Brasil, 
Spain, United Kingdom and USA in total assets. 
                                                          
104 I have done some adjustments to the original model provided by Damodaran. 
Exhibit 48 – National and international total assets at YE2011 (in € mn). Data reported in January 
2012. 
Source: BES annual report (2011) & own calculations 
Exhibit 47 - Geographical areas contribution to the 
consolidated net income (in € mn) 
Source: BES Financials & own calculations 
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Market risk premium 9,53%
Bu 0,11






2008 2009 2010 2011
Net Income 402 523 557 167
Total Banking Income 1.888 2.450 2.404 1.950
Total Assets 75.187 82.297 83.655 80.237
Asset Utilization 2,5% 3,0% 2,9% 2,4%
Profit Margin 21,3% 21,3% 23,2% 8,6%
2012




Damodaran assumes total market risk premium to be the equity risk premium for 
mature markets (6%) plus a country risk premium, determined by the multiplying of country 






To compute market risk premium, I scrutinised the composition of 2011 total assets105 
by geographical area (domestic/international), in which Portugal accounted for 73% and the 
remaining accounted for 25%. I must catch your attention to point out the missing 2% belongs 
to other emerging economies where BES is exposed. It was not considered as they did not 
represent a significant share in total assets. 
 The unlevered beta corresponds to small/regional banks sector average outlined by 
Damodaran, whilst risk free interest rate was chosen to be 10-year German bunds. The debt to 
equity ratio was implicit to be consolidated total liabilities over consolidated equity and the 
corporate tax is in line with what was said in section VI, 2., f). 
 The levered beta of BES respected the following equation:  




, and was used to calculate the demanded ROE through the CAPM106, which depicted 11.35%. 
As data must be consistent, net 
income, total banking income and total 
assets were consolidated figures because 
later on the computation of net asset value required the strip of 
certain omitted capital gains/losses that were only disclosed on a 
global perspective by BES group. 
 
 
                                                          
105 € mn 80,237 mn as of YE2011.  
106
        ( [    ]    ) 
Exhibit 49 – Inputs for CAPM  
Source: Damodaran, Bloomberg & own 
calculations 
Exhibit 50 – Forecasted ROE 
Source: BES Financials & own calculations 
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2008 2009 2010 2011
Equity 6.192
Pension fund shortfalls -8 73 1 107
Amortised actuarial differences 46 45
Tax credits that are going to end - - - 31
Unrealized capital (gains)/losses 266 -593 10 445
Net asset value 5.564
Domestic International
ROE Demanded 0,25 €               0,09 €               
BES Value Value per share (Consolidated)
1.351 0,34 €                                               
ROA was submitted in accordance with what was set in YE2011. In fact, although the net 
income was € -109 mn, I got rid of one-time events that were influencing negatively the 
profitability of the business. Thus, the net income without these effects was about € 167 mn. 
As can be seen in exhibit 50, from 2010 to 2011 the net income followed an arrow’s fall, 
an event that implied an extremely low ROA for 2012, even though I yielded a growth rate of 




As I mentioned before, the real equity value is the book value of equity striped of certain 
unrealised gains/losses that inflates its worthiness. Therefore, the amounts for pension fund 
shortfalls were stretched by the difference of total post-employment benefits and the fair value 
of plan assets. 
Due to the abolition of the corridor method to recognise actuarial differences, I found it 
reasonable to get rid of it as it would not be accounted in the traditional income statement, more 
precisely in staff costs item. 
The 2011 financial year was a total black hole to the profitability of the bank. The 
negative net income (€ -109 mn) led to a tax credit of € 31 mn. 
At last but not the least, the unrealised capital gains/losses were fair value reserves 
arising from available for-sale financial assets and deferred tax reserves. 
In general, the real equity value (NAV) was € 5,564 mn. 
 
Given that value per share was attained in consolidated terms due to the reason stated 
above, the price per share of € 0.34 was split up into each geographical area contribution to 
2011 total assets. Saying that so, € 0.25 would go to domestic area and the remaining € 0.09 to 
international area. At the end, this valuation method would signal a short-sell of BES shares in 
contrast to the market price € 0.454 on May 30 2012. 
  
Exhibit 51 – Net asset value deducted of unrealised gains/losses (in € mn) 
Source: BES annual reports & own calculations 
Exhibit 52 – BES value per share (in €) 
Source: BES annual reports & own calculations 
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2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Terminal Value
Market risk premium 10,13% 10,13% 7,90% 7,90% 7,90% 6,28%
Bu 0,11 0,11 0,11 0,11 0,11 0,11
Rf (German bund 10-years) 1,41% 1,41% 1,41% 1,41% 1,41% 1,41%
D/E 11,04 10,51 9,99 9,52 9,27 9,27
T 29,0% 29,0% 29,0% 29,0% 29,0% 29,0%
BL 0,97 0,93 0,89 0,85 0,83 0,83
Re 11,26% 10,84% 8,44% 8,15% 8,00% 6,65%
Cost of equity 11,26% 10,84% 8,44% 8,15% 8,00% 6,65%
Mature market Country risk premium Total risk premium
Country Bond Default Spread 6% 3,25% 9,25%
Relative Equity Market Volatility 6% 0,28% 6,28%
Melded Approach 6% 1,90% 7,90%
2. Damodaran – Excess return model 
a) Domestic area 
These inputs followed the same procedure as the one detailed in exhibit 49, apart from 
debt-to-equity ratio and total market risk premium. In the first case, I applied a contribution rate 
for domestic assets over the total consolidated (≃ 73%). The latter on tracked country bond 
default spread, relative equity market volatility and the melded approach to estimate country 
risk premium. 
 
Country bond default spread is revealed by finding at first a sovereign rating for Portugal 
provided by Moody’s and then looking up the sovereign default spread according to 
Damodaran’s table of sovereign CDS107.  
On February 13 2012 Moody’s cut one notch for Portugal to Ba3 from Ba2. Hence, the 
country risk premium would be 3.25%, added up to the risk premium for mature markets of 6% 
as stated in subsection Dupont analysis. 
Relative equity market volatility is for analysts who believe equity risk depends on the 
volatilities of Portugal and US markets. The Portuguese risk premium is defined as: 
                            
                                                              
,where                                            
                          
                    
. 
The last approach combines the info in country default spread and the equity market 
volatility. In fact,                                                     (
       
            
). 
                                                          
107 Damodaran, A. (March 2012). Equity risk premiums: Determinants, estimation and implications. pp. 1-
107. 
Exhibit 53 – Inputs to compute domestic cost of equity 
Source: Damodaran, Bloomberg, Moody’s & own calculations 
Exhibit 54 – Different approaches to determine country risk premium 
Source: Damodaran ( March 2012), Moody’s 
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Angola Brazil Spain United Kingdom United States of America
Country Bond Default Spread 10,88% 8,63% 7,28% 6,00% 6,00%
Relative Equity Market Volatility 5,01% 6,69% 8,94% 6,00% 6,00%
Melded Approach 7,46% 9,03% 6,80% 6,00% 6,00%
Total assets 6.867 2.681 5.909 3.575 1.398
Total assets - International
% of TA - International 34% 13% 29% 18% 7%
20429
2012 E 2013 E 2014 E 2015 E 2016 E Terminal Value
Net income -161 55 224 275 299 304
Growth rate -2,56% 0,41% 1,59% 1,85% 1,91% 1,91%
Equity cost 653 665 595 607 624 528
Excess equity return -814 -610 -370 -331 -325 -224
TV of equity excess return -4.735
Cumulated cost of equity 1,10 1,21 1,32 1,42 1,54
PV of equity excess return -737 -502 -281 -233 -3.289
BV of equity 6.279 6.636 7.051 7.448 7.799 7.948
Ke 10,41% 10,02% 8,44% 8,15% 8,00% 6,65%
Equity cost 653 665 595 607 624 528
ROE -2,561% 0,823% 3,183% 3,698% 3,828% 3,828%
Net income -161 55 224 275 299 304
Dividend Payout ratio 0% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50,00%
Dividends paid 0 27 112 138 149
Retained earnings -161 27 112 138 149
Value of equity 1.236
PV of equity excess return -5.043
Number of shares 4.017.928
Value per share 0,31 €         
A good practice of adjusting country risk premiums over time is to consider at first the 
premium arisen in country bond default spread and adjust it downwards, in which       terminal 
value takes the lowest percentage (6.28%) to make a better assessment of Portugal’s economy in 
the medium/long term – see exhibit 53. 
The model 
fundamentals consist of 
extracting the equity excess 
return, this is net income 
minus cost of equity in 
absolute terms. Since ROE has 
been inferior to cost of equity 
(   , the domestic activity has been destroying value.  
The growth rate of the 
terminal value was assumed 
to be the same as the 2016 growth rate of earnings108, instead of the nominal growth rate of the 
Portuguese economy. 
As for the dividend policy, BES states on its website “the bank seeks to pay dividends to 
its shareholders corresponding to at least 50% of its net individual earnings”. Thus, in 2012 I 
anticipated it would not pay out any dividends as in 2011 and from 2013 onwards paying out 
50%. 
At last, adding up the 2012 book value of equity to the present value of equity excess 
return divided by total outstanding shares we come to a conclusion the domestic price per share 
is about € 0.31. 
b) International area 
The international arena is essentially exposed to Angola, Brazil, Spain, United Kingdom 
and United States of America as stressed out above. However, the total risk premium per 
country implies the weight of its contribution to the overall total market risk premium. In order 
to do that, I ascertained each country’s 2011 assets over the total 2011 international assets. 
I must refer Angola was not listed in Equity risk premium paper published by 
Damodaran. To solve this issue I thought of attributing the exposure of South Africa to Angola. 
  
                                                          
108                      . 
Exhibit 55 – Adjusted excess return model by Damodaran – Domestic area 
Source: Damodaran & own adjustments 
Exhibit 56 – Weight of total risk premium per country for different country risk premium approaches 
Source: Damodaran (March 2012), BES annual report (2011) & own calculations 
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2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Terminal Value
Market risk premium 8,36% 8,36% 7,12% 7,12% 7,12% 6,61%
Rf (US Treasury Bonds 10-years) 1,78% 1,78% 1,78% 1,78% 1,78% 1,78%
BL 1,05 1,05 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,95
Re 10,55% 10,55% 8,90% 8,90% 8,90% 8,06%
Cost of equity 10,55% 10,55% 8,90% 8,90% 8,90% 8,06%
2012 E 2013 E 2014 E 2015 E 2016 E Terminal Value
Net income 177 204 221 269 276 286
Growth rate 3,62%
Equity cost 131 138 124 131 137 129
Excess equity return 46 66 97 138 139 157
TV of equity excess return 3.547
Cumulated cost of equity 1,11 1,22 1,33 1,45 1,58
PV of equity excess return 42 54 73 95 2.335
BV of equity 1.240 1.310 1.392 1.470 1.540 1.596
Ke 10,55% 10,55% 8,90% 8,90% 8,90% 8,06%
Equity cost 131 138 124 131 137 129
ROE 14,28% 15,61% 15,85% 18,30% 17,92% 17,92%
Net income 177 204 221 269 276 286
Dividend Payout ratio 0% 23% 10% 12% 13% 12,52%
Dividends paid 0 47 21 31 35
Retained earnings 177 157 199 238 241
Value of equity 3.839
PV of equity excess return 2.599
Number of shares 4.017.928
Value per share 0,96 €         
The market risk premium trailed the same reasoning as before, decreasing over time. 
The risk free interest rate was the 10-year US treasury bonds as they are normally the 
benchmark to assess emerging economies.  
The beta levered 
corresponds to small/regional 
banks in emerging markets and 
throughout the time line I 
reduced it by 0.05 to show that 
the risk of investing in businesses 
of emerging markets tend to slow. 
Likewise, an UK Reuteurs 
article109  mentioned that 
emerging markets beta was in 2011 close to 1 in comparison with the last five years, indicating 
that it is not as risky as we may think at first instance. 
One of the major differences between domestic and international valuation was the 
ability of the international business to generate positive excess returns, i.e.       . The 
growth rate comprised the proportion of each international country multiplied by the projected 
real GDP growth rate for 2017 published in World Economic Outlook – IMF, which led to a 
3.62% growth rate. 
The dividend pay-out ratio depended on the total consolidated amount of dividend paid 
(estimates) minus the dividends paid in domestic area. In the end, the equity value of € 3.839 
mn divided by 4.017,93 mn shares provided a final international price per share of € 0.96. 
Although domestic outlook has a higher expression in total balance sheet compared to 
international outlook, the latter one is showing resilience by higher profitability ratios and most 
of all is not destroying value for the shareholders. 
Thus, the final price per share is € 1.27. 
                                                          
109 Gaunt, J. (January 28 2011). UK Reuteurs. Obtained on April 5 2012, 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/01/28/us-markets-investors-developed-idUKTRE70R24R20110128 
 
Exhibit 57 – Inputs for CAPM  
Source: Damodaran (March 2012), Bloomberg & own calculations 
Exhibit 58 – Adjusted excess return model by Damodaran – 
International area 
Source: Damodaran & own adjustments 
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2012 E 2013 E 2014 E 2015 E 2016 E
Net income -161 55 224 275 299
Reinvestment for regulatory capital 489 27 112 138 149
Cash flow to the equityholders -650 27 112 138 149
Ke 11,26% 10,83% 8,43% 8,14% 7,99%
Cumulated cost of equity 1,113 1,233 1,337 1,446 1,561
PV cash flows -584 22 84 95 96
∑ PV cash flows -287,32
Growth Future cash flow Terminal value Explicit period + Terminal value = ∑  PV of all cash flows Value per share - Domestic
1% 151 4.172 0,97 €                                                    
2% 152 5.024 1,18 €                                                    




3. Free cash flow to the equity 
a) Domestic area 
This model indicates the free cash flow to equityholders is the one left after debt 
payments and regulatory capital needs are met. The free cash flow to equity can be isolated as:  
                                                                         
First of all, the degree of profitability is crucial and is defined in terms of net income. 
Indeed, we must specify how much net profit the bank is able to generate with each additional 
loan granted.  
Second, the reinvestment in regulatory capital will be influenced by the capital standards 






From the 2012 net income it is excluded the change in core tier 1, i.e., the change in 
retained earnings, a remarkable event in 2012 – the € 1,010 mn capital increase – see exhibit 
30, the purchase of BES Vida, the total potential loss on European sovereign exposure and finally 
the buffer for the public debt less deferrals and pensions              111 . The y-o-y 
absolute change in core tier 1 – see exhibit 46 was of € 489 mn. 
In the upcoming years as I did not expect any capital increases, I just deducted the 
retained earnings estimated each year. 
By keeping consistency on domestic cost of equity and the growth rate (1.91%) amongst 
the valuation approaches, I say domestic are creating value per share to its shareholders of 
about € 1.18. 
b) International area 
                                                          
110 European Banking Authority. 
111 I assumed 85% of the value stated by Joaquim Freixial de Goes in Q4 BES conference call was truth. 
Exhibit 59 – Domestic free cash flow to equity (in € mn) 
Source: Damodaran (March 2012) & own calculations 
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2012 E 2013 E 2014 E 2015 E 2016 E
Net income 177 204 221 269 276
Reinvestment for regulatory capital 177 157 199 238 241
Cash flow to the equityholders 0 47 21 31 35
Ke 10,55% 10,55% 8,90% 8,90% 8,90%
Cumulated cost of equity 1,106 1,222 1,331 1,449 1,578
PV cash flows 0 39 16 21 22
∑ PV cash flows 98,0429
Growth Future cash flow Terminal value Explicit period + Terminal value = ∑  PV of all cash flows Value per share - International
3% 36 1.110 0,30 €                                                    
3,62% 36 1.274 0,34 €                                                    







Regarding the international free cash flow to equity, I removed from international net 
income the retained earnings per year. The growth rate and international cost of equity were 
kept consistent with the inputs of excess return model. 
Thus, the international price per share is € 0.34, which diverges from the previous 
model. In fact, the international valuation was penalised given that the dividends pay-out ratio is 
at maximum 40 p.p. below from the domestic business. This situation fosters reinvestment in 
regulatory standards, which translates into a price per share devaluation. 
Generally speaking, the closing price converges to € 1.52. 
4. Relative Valuation 
Throughout the literature review we saw that relative valuation implied a different 
approach from DCF method. Indeed, the purpose is to look at the market and extract the value 
paid for similar assets, so that we know how much the underlying asset is worth. 
Nevertheless, as an analyst I bear the risk the market may be or may not be wrong in the 
way it prices the assets; If there is no visible anomaly, on average, DCF method and relative 
valuation tend to go side by side; On the other hand, if that is not the case, the systematic 
underpricing or overpricing of a certain sector gives rise to inconsistency among these two 
frameworks. 
The banking system must comply with strict and specific capital standards, being 
forbidden to expand by more than its means, which aids equityholders and depositors not being 
put at risk. 
Moreover, the constraints imposed by the regulatory entities not only persist whenever 
banks dare to allocate its resources (inputs), but also whenever a new financial service firm 
intends to enter the market and in the situation of mergers & acquisitions. 
Exhibit 60 – International free cash flow to equity (in € mn) 
Source: Damodaran (March 2012) & own calculations 
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ROE ROA D/E P/TBV P/E Div. Yield Core Tier I Ratio Assets Growth
Alpha Bank -10,17% -0,85% 457% 0,05 -0,42 0,00% 10,00% -7,42%
Banco De Sabadell 4,37% 0,29% 711% 0,85 17,16 1,31% 9,10% 11,70%
Banco Popular Espanol 5,75% 0,36% 537% 0,62 9,95 1,19% 9,76% 2,57%
Banif 1,32% 0,08% 687% 0,19 15,82 5,65% 8,00% 7,17%
Bankinter n/a 0,25% n/a n/a 13,92 0,97% 8,43% 13,12%
BES 4,01% 0,29% 663% 0,27 6,32 9,43% 8,10% 0,77%
BPI 12,65% 0,31% 1407% 0,49 3,10 0,00% 9,00% -8,74%
Espírito Santo Financial Group 6,13% 0,08% 8707% 0,88 8,22 5,45% 7,60% 1,44%
Millennium BCP 2,47% 0,15% 662% 0,15 5,52 16,36% 9,10% -2,09%
Deutsche Bank 2,93% 0,06% 780% 0,59 19,06 2,76% 10,10% 16,59%
Since in recent years the increase in capital ratios have been voguish and the banking 
system has been facing liquidity risk prompted by adverse market conditions, the overall sector 
trends may be a good predictor of BES fair value through dominant multiples: P/E and P/B. 
Hereby, I decided to use backward-looking multiples, i.e., trailing 12 months multiples as a 
matter of believing future performance will not differ significantly from recent past performance 
due to the recent sovereign debt crisis and funding concerns. From a list of nine banks picked 
randomly, I pre-selected the most crucial financial ratios for the banking system to deliberate 
what would be the most reliable peer group for BES, such as: ROE, ROA, D/E, P/TBV112, PER113, 
dividend yield, core tier I and assets growth, as it can be conferred in the above exhibit. 
Starting by the breakdown of the profitability ratios, I assigned net income as the 
summation of the cumulative Q3 2011 and the Q4 2010. Afterwards I divided it by the average 
total common equity (ROE) and total assets (ROA). Both denominators took into account 
cumulative values of Q3 2010 and Q3 2011. The purpose was to study the ability of sources 
and/or uses of funds to generate income for the common shareholders. 
Debt-to-tangible equity ratio was also computed in accordance with the results of 
cumulative Q3 2011. The price-to-tangible book value of equity ratio and the price-to-earnings 
ratio reflected in the numerator market value prices of December 16 2011, obtained at 
Bloomberg online. As for the tangible book value of equity, I deducted intangible assets from 
total common equity to reach the result of the cumulative twelve months until Q3 2011. The 
thing is that tangible book value expresses what common shareholders will receive if the bank 
files for bankruptcy and all its assets are liquidated. Hence, it does a better job in estimating the 
true value for its shareholders. 
The dividend yield was searched on Bloomberg online on December 16 2011 and the 
core tier 1 ratio on Q3 2011 reports. In effect, banks paying out excessive dividends would be 
punished by the regulatory overlay; by paying out too little dividends, the punishment would be 
set by investors. Finally, the assets growth, in relative terms, comprised cum. Q3 2010 and cum. 
Q3 2011. The growth prospects should be attractive to expect higher cash flows for the bank and 
                                                          
112 Price-to-tangible book value of equity. 
113 Price-to-earnings ratio. 
Exhibit 61 – Selection of financial ratios to infer the peer group 
Source: Company reports & own calculations 
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Earnings Tangible Book Value Number of Shares
BES 242.922 5.735.118 1.461.240
P/TBV Absolute values Value Per Share P/E
BES 0,27 1.534.302 €                1,05 €                         6,32
Min 0,15 860.926 €                    0,59 €                         5,52
Max 0,88 5.059.649 €                3,46 €                         19,06
Weighted Average 0,61 3.510.013 €                2,40 €                         17,51
4.630.861 €                      
4.254.414 €                      
Value Per Share
1,05 €                                  
0,92 €                                  
3,17 €                                  
2,91 €                                  
Absolutes Values
1.534.302 €                      
1.341.257 €                      
perceive the stock as a good buy, however that is not the case due to the diligence of running the 
deleverage programme. 
Concerning the features of BES Q3 2011 results, profitability ratios were above the 
average of the random group, D/E was well-balanced and P/TBV and P/E multiples were low. 
The dividend policy, in relative terms, was quite attractive taking into account the recessionary 
period and core tier 1 ratio showed resilience. The business growth was nothing more than a 
reminiscence of the balance sheet deleverage started in 2010. 
Saying that so, how and which stocks depict similar figures? 
To clear up this question, I submitted a strict range for each variable to come up with the 
upper and lower limit in comparison with BES figures – see appendix 19. In fact, if the value 
computed exceeded that range, it would turn out to be crossed from the comparable financial 
institutions’ list.  
The comparable companies observed were Banco de Sabadell, Banco Popular Espanol, 
Banif, ESFG114, Millennium BCP and Deutsche Bank. 
Stemming from the peer group’s market capitalization, I ascribed a weight to each 
comparable concerning the two most influential multiples, and then I summed it up – see 
appendix 20. The main goal was to come up with the fair price for BES by multiplying it by 
earnings (                 ) and by tangible book value (              ). As a matter of 
fact, the fair value per share for BES on December 16 2011, on a weighted average basis, was of 
€2.40 (P/TBV) and € 2.91(P/E) – see exhibit 62. 
This gives us the hint the potential upside risk is of 129% and 177%, respectively after 
reporting a market price of €1.05. 
According to Damodaran’s recent thoughts115, a real bargain is the bank that trades at a 
low P/B ratio, has a high CT1 and shows an impressive ROE. Although BES fails in the third 
dimension, falling below the average116 of the observable financial institutions by a small margin 
                                                          
114 Espírito Santo Financial Group. 
115
 Damodaran, A. (29 March 2011). Damodaran Blog. Obtained on 29 December 2011,  Musings on 
Markets: http://aswathdamodaran.blogspot.pt/2011/03/breach-of-trust-bank-valuation-after.html 
116 Excluding Alpha Bank due to its negative ROE. 
Exhibit 62 – Relative Valuation of BES 
Source: Company reports, bloomberg, own calculations 
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Domestic International Domestic International Domestic International
0,25 €           0,09 €           0,31 €           0,96 €           1,18 €           0,34 €           
0,34 €                                       
Relative Valuation
2,4€ / 2,91€
Free cash flow to equityExcess return modelDupont analysis
1,26 €                                       1,52 €                                       
(                         ), we cannot deny the stock is being traded at a large 
discount in the market (underpricing), a result of the systematic sovereign debt downgrades. 




The purpose of assessing different valuation models is to come up with a final price 
target that reflects the fair value of the bank.  
From my point of view, Dupont method does not correctly provide the fair price for BES 
group. By taking out the one-time events that put its 2011 net income at risk, it was not enough 
to carry out a satisfactory ROA for the next year, which led to a heavy devaluation of the bank’s 
share price. In addition, the model is not forward-looking as it is subject to historical data that 
may miss the growing opportunities in emerging markets the bank faces. Furthermore, it is 
implicit BES is undervalued due to the sovereign debt crisis, in which Greece is the head of the 
recent turmoil.  As a result, I cross off from the list the short-sell recommendation reported 
by this method. The market price on May 25 2012 was € 0.487. 
The free cash flow to equity will not be considered to ascribe a fair value price for BES 
for the reason that international outlook is being devaluated as opposed to domestic outlook. 
The latter one is taking advantage of an expressive dividend policy (at least 50%) from an 
individual perspective, raising the price to a certain level that I consider meaningless. As a 
matter of fact, the international activity will tend to have a bigger share on the overall net 
income, and most of all yields a high profitability for a very little international balance sheet. As 
a consequence, I cross off from the list the buy recommendation reported by this method. 
The relative valuation where I found the peer group does not track the recent events 
carried out by the bank, mainly the capital increase of € 1,’010 mn, meaning that € 2.40 (P/TBV) 
and € 2.91 (P/E) was correctly inferred at the time, but now it is obsolete. Thus, I cross off 
from the list the buy recommendation reported by this method. 
Therefore, the final consideration is to stick to excess return model to determine the fair 
value of BES shares. It is the only model that punishes the inability of the bank to create value to 
its shareholders for the domestic business. Nevertheless, it catches the growth opportunities in 
emerging markets. 
Exhibit 63 - Decision of BES target price 
Source: Own calculations 
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6,0% 6,5% 6,6% 7,0% 7,5%
2,5% 0,236 € 0,211 € 0,227 € 0,222 €    0,206 € -2%
2,0% 0,321 € 0,290 € 0,303 € 0,294 €    0,274 € -1%
1,9% 0,318 € 0,288 € 0,301 € 0,291 €    0,272 € 0%
1,5% 0,369 € 0,336 € 0,347 € 0,336 €    0,315 € 1%
1,0% 0,424 € 0,389 € 0,398 € 0,385 €    0,362 € 2%
-2% -1% 0% 1% 2%
Domestic









∆ Net interest income
The price target of BES is € 1.26, a buy recommendation to investors as it suggests 
a potential upside risk of 159%. 
E. Sensitivity Analysis 
The sensitivity analysis purpose is to see how the main value drivers would impact the 
final share price for BES. The selection of the best method to determine the fair value for the two 
different geographical areas was detailed. 
According to Young, Sullivan, Nokhasteh, & Holt (1999), the valuation models are so 
sensitive to variations in things we cannot estimate accurately such as the terminal value. The 
problem is that practitioners usually spend 80%/90% of their time forecasting the near future, 
rather than the medium/long term. This occurs because analysts feel more comfortable 
estimating what is usually disclosed in the market, which drives to a heavily undervalued or 







For that reason, I resolved to ascribe different growth rates and the cost of equity for the 
terminal value and the change of two other relevant variables in a bank P&L statement – net 
interest income and staff costs. The baseline scenario is calibrated to a growth rate of 1.9%, a 
cost of equity of 6.6% and no changes in net interest income and staff costs. Thus, the domestic 
value per share accounts to € 0.301. 
It is implicit the terminal value goes off if we drop the cost equity and rise the growth 
rate, prevailing      condition, otherwise it would not make sense from a theoretical point of 
view. That is, the cost of equity is equal to ROE in stable growth period. 
Nevertheless, I remind you domestic outlook is one of those special cases of value 
destruction. If you increase cost of equity, the negative equity excess return in stable period 
deteriorates. Remaining constant the growth rate, the present value of the terminal value 
worsen. For a better conception, please read the table from your left hand to the right hand. 
Exhibit 64 – Domestic sensitivity analysis (in €) 
Source: Own analysis 
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7,0% 7,5% 8,1% 8,5% 9,0%
4,5% 1,452 € 1,268 € 1,124 € 1,045 €    0,971 € -2%
4,0% 1,257 € 1,127 € 1,021 € 0,961 €    0,903 € -1%
3,6% 1,144 € 1,042 € 0,955 € 0,906 €    0,858 € 0%
3,0% 1,011 € 0,938 € 0,874 € 0,837 €    0,800 € 1%
2,5% 0,928 € 0,871 € 0,820 € 0,791 €    0,761 € 2%
-2% -1% 0% 1% 2%









∆ Net interest income
International
On the other hand, for a certain level of cost of equity, the fluctuation in growth rate in an 
increasing direction worsens off the negative equity excess return, bringing down the fair value 
of the bank. For a better understanding, please read the table from the top to the bottom. 
The third effect is the diagonal scale. By moving up cost of equity and moving down the 
growth rate, the equity excess return improves, ranging from € 0.236 to € 0.362. 
Interestingly, a negative change in staff costs (- 200 basis points) and a positive change in 
net interest income (+ 200 basis points) is nowhere sufficient to contradict the effects described 








In respect to the international sensitivity analysis, the data interpretation is the 
traditional conception described before. The baseline scenario is as it follows: growth rate of 
3.6%, cost of equity of 8.1% and no changes for net interest income and staff costs, yielding € 
0.955. 
For a certain degree of growth rate, the higher the cost of equity, the lower the fair value. 
For the same level of cost of equity, the higher the growth rate, the higher the price target. 
Finally, an increase in cost of equity and a plunge in growth rate lead to a lower final price, 
ranging from € 1.452 to € 0.761. 
Again, the P&L variables are not so powerful as terminal value components, although for 
the best scenario (-200 basis points in staff costs and +200 basis points in net interest income), 
the price yielded is higher than the adverse scenario (+200 basis points in staff costs and -200 
basis points in net interest income). 
V. Comparison With CaixaBI Banking Report 
Caixa BI’s report of the Portuguese financial system published on December 13, 2011 
does not take into account the capital increase of € 530 mn. The bank revised BES fair value per 
share to € 2.7, down from the previous price target of € 4. Besides that, according to ESN 
Exhibit 65 – International sensitivity analysis (in €) 
Source: Own calculations 
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recommendation system, the investment bank maintains its buy recommendation as opposed to 
the closing price of € 1.13117. 
A. Valuation methods 
Caixa BI’s valuation of the Portuguese financial institutions (BES, BCP and BPI) is 
grounded on three approaches, each one accounting for 1/3 of the final price. 
1. Discounted cash flow model 
The investment bank outlines cash flow as the difference between the net income and 
the retained capital, which is nothing more than the increase in core tier 1 expressed as 
         . The 10% is in line with the new capital standard published by Bank of Portugal 
to be accomplished at the end of 2012. 
They also provide a normalized capital employed, i.e., the computation of          
   . The reason why it is 2011 and not 2012 has to do with the fact that the report was 
submitted under Q3 2011 results. Therefore, at the time there was the need to look into 2011’s 
performance. 
The fair value of BES was the summation of the excess capital foreseen for 2011, i.e., the 
forecasted 2011 capital118 minus the standard capital defined as normalized capital employed, 
plus the present value of future cash flow and the terminal value and finally the 2011 dividends 
expected to be paid in 2012. From my point there is a flaw because the bank did not consider the 
capital increase of € 530 mn carried out in 2011, which may lead to a biased excess capital for 
2011. 
In that sense, I would say the free cash flow to equity has some similarities for 2012 
prospects since I took into consideration the relative change in core tier 1 and from 2012 
onwards the inside policies that influences the dividends pay-out ratio and the capacity to retain 
earnings. 
The reason why I thought this would be a valuable option had to do with the expectation 
core tier 1 would depend mainly on BES retained earnings to increase its capital ratio. In fact, in 
the near future BES will not be willing to announce a new capital increase as it would damage 
shareholders’ wealth and their stake in the bank. 
Furthermore, the 2011 dividends paid in 2012 is useless since the bank did not paid out 
any dividends. 
                                                          
117 As of December 12, 2011. 




BES 1.497 Risk free rate 4,5% 4,5%
BPI 1.188 Beta 1,30
BCP 1.284 Market Risk Premium 4,0% 4,75%
Banco Popular 1.237 Cost of equity 10,77%





2. Bond pricing model (adjusted with dividends) 
The forecasted ROE is the average of 2011-2015 ROE estimates divided by ROE 
demanded obtained through CAPM. The net asset value is ROE forecasted/ROE demanded plus 
the 2015 equity, which is afterwards adjusted to current prices (today). Furthermore, the 
investment bank adds the 2011-2015 present value of dividends. From my understanding It 
does not create any value since BES frozen its dividend policy. 
This model sounded promising because it is forward-looking in contrast to Dupont 
method, nevertheless it fails by just striping of only the pension fund shortfalls. 
Indeed, there are many more we should get rid of such as unrealized capital gains/losses, 
lack of provisions, tax credit that are going to end, amortised actuarial differences that are no 
more recognised in the traditional P&L statement. 
3. Residual income model 
Caixa BI displays this model as: 
                                                                      
The only difference ascertained was the average equity. The literature review hinted the 
use of book value of equity, however I am not in the position to criticise this model as it 
definitely yields a coherent result. 
B. Valuation assumptions 
The risk free rate and the market risk premium are standardised in order to engage into 
the specifications of ESN network. However, due to the exposure of the bank to international 






The Portuguese market risk premium was 4%, whereas the international operation was 
about 7%. The betas are 1.34 and 1.25, respectively. From the UK Reuteurs article I referred 
above, emerging economies are not as risky as we once perceived and tend to be close to 1, 
meaning the perfect correlation between the international operations with the market. 
Regarding Portugal I released a lower beta through the relationship amongst financial leverage, 
beta unlevered and corporate tax rate. 
Exhibit 66 – Valuation assumptions in CaixaBI’s 
banking report 




2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 E 2013 E 2014 E 2015 E 2016 E
Net interest margin - Dissertation 1,76% 1,77% 1,61% 1,68% 1,67% 1,67% 1,70% 1,77% 1,79%
Net interest margin - CaixaBI 1,90% 2,00%
Cost-to-income ratio - Dissertation 53% 43% 47% 58% 64% 61% 57% 56% 55%
Cost-to-income ratio - CaixaBI 60% 57%
ROE - Dissertation 8,6% 7,5% 7,4% -1,8% 0,2% 3,3% 5,3% 6,1% 6,2%
ROE - CaixaBI 1,9% 4,4%
Customer loans-to-deposit ratio - Dissertation 178% 192% 165% 143% 130% 120% 120% 120% 120%
Customer loans-to-deposit ratio - CaixaBI 135% 129%
Non performing loans coverage - Dissertation 219,0% 191,5% 173,0% 154,5% 169,0% 168,7% 168,4% 167,7% 167,0%
Non performing loans coverage - CaixaBI 119,0% 141,5%
Credit provisions reserve/ Gross customer loans - Dissertation 2,4% 3,1% 3,4% 4,2% 4,6% 4,6% 4,3% 3,8% 3,4%
Credit provisions reserve/ Gross customer loans - CaixaBI 5,6% 6,6%
Non performing loans/Gross customer loans - Dissertation 1,1% 1,6% 2,0% 2,7% 2,7% 2,7% 2,5% 2,3% 2,1%
Non performing loans/Gross customer loans - CaixaBI 4,7% 4,6%
Core tier 1 - Dissertation 6,1% 8,0% 7,9% 9,2% 10,0% 10,0% 10,0% 10,0% 10,0%
Core tier 1 - CaixaBI 8,4% 8,4%
Dividend Payout ratio (consolidated) - Dissertation 20% 31% 29% 0% 0% 29% 30% 31% 32%
Dividend Payout ratio (consolidated) - CaixaBI 0% 0%
In my opinion, even though the bank has made an adjustment it did not reflect the true 
market risk premium, because ESN lowered too much the market risk premium of mature 
markets (4%) as opposed to the 6% stated in Damodaran. In addition, there may be the case the 
investment bank devaluated the country risk premium, turning down again the market risk 
premium. As I identified before, there were three methodologies to come up with better 
estimates for country risk premium. 
Moreover, I pursued a detailed geographical analysis that allowed me to realize better 
the business. This decision brought implications in relation to the assessment of betas, market 
risk premiums, cost of equity and perpetual growth rates. Likewise, I did not find appealing the 
fact CaixaBI turned cost of equity static over time. 
As a matter of fact, markets are moving at a fast pace, which is wrong to assume the 
ceteris paribus condition. As for the perpetual growth rate (2.6%) I found it quite feasible, given 
that my international baseline scenario was intended to be 3.62% and the domestic one about 
1.91%. If you weight international activity by 25% and domestic activity by the remaining, the 
percentage generated would be 2.34%. 
C. Sensitivity analysis 
The sensitivity analysis is limited to two variables comprised in the terminal value, when 
actually there are plenty of them that should be tested in the final price and may cause huge 
discrepancies. As I mentioned before, I took into account four variables: perpetual growth rate, 
cost of equity and the change in net interest income & staff costs. 




Exhibit 67 – Comparison of key performance ratios between my dissertation and 
CaixaBI’s banking report 
Source: CaixaBI’s banking report (December 13 2011) & own calculations 
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The net interest margin is too high in comparison with my estimates. From my point of 
view, the deleverage programme reduces the possibility of earning more through bank lending. 
On the other hand, the attempt to seize new customer deposits is translated into a boost in 
deposit margin. This event will potentially reduce the spread between interest earning assets 
and interest earning liabilities. 
My dissertation’s cost-to-income ratio outperforms the one from CaixaBI, because the 
investment bank presumes an upper total banking income, impelled by non-interest income, 
whilst I am cautious about it. Actually, the commissions on loans, the asset management and 
bancassurance may plunge sharply, revealing a generalized anti-risk appetite amongst investors. 
Regarding ROE, I believe CaixaBI’s is confident about BES succeeding in net profit, which 
contradicts my reasoning thanks to the turmoil trend in the Portuguese economy that pushes 
down the profitability of the bank. On the other hand, the IB did not consider the two recent 
capital increases – see exhibit 30. 
Customer loans-to-deposit ratio is decreasing sharply and I do ponder BES will comply 
with the 2014 ratio of 120% in 2013. However, CaixaBI seems cautious about BES perseverance 
in meeting the requirement right before the official deadline.  
Traditionally, non performing-loans have been covered by more than 100%. The 
sentiment between me and CaixaBI will remain. The balance sheet credit provision reserves are 
not explicitly specified in CaixaBI’s report. Thus, it is tough to draw a conclusion, albeit the IB bet 
on its reinforcement over gross customer loans. In terms of non-performing loans, CaixaBI 
suggest a deep aggravation, whereas I engage in a 2011 look alike for 2012-2013 years.  
The core tier 1 ratio presented by the IB escapes from the reality, a percentage well 
below of 2012 target (10%). Finally, the dividend policy will possibly get back at its own record 
in 2013, contradicting the line of reasoning of CaixaBI (0%). 
VI. Conclusion 
The main goal of this dissertation was to come up with a fair value price for BES shares 
through the application of the most suitable methods to evaluate financial services. The choice of 
adjusted excess return model by Damodaran yielded a price target of € 1.26, which signals a buy 
recommendation to potential investors. 
Its potential upside risk of 159% is nowhere nonsensical since in YE2011 BES market 
share price was being traded closely to that price. In the near future, I expect BES will enhance 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3
Net interest income 1.49 1.42 1.37 1.43 1.35
Income (net) from services and commissions 0.72 0.71 0.70 0.71 0.67
Income from financial operations 0.17 0.30 0.14 0.17 0.12
Other income 0.18 0.25 0.09 0.26 0.05
Gross income 2.56 2.69 2.30 2.57 2.19
Operating costs 1.44 1.51 1.32 1.45 1.30
Provisions and impairment 0.70 0.64 0.52 1.15 0.90
Of which: associated with credit to customers 0.42 0.43 0.40 1.00 0.54
Consolidation differences and appropriation of income -0.09 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 0.00
Income before tax and minority interests 0.51 0.60 0.52 0.00 0.00
Income tax profit 0.07 0.02 0.09 -0.21 0.01
Income before minority interests 0.44 0.58 0.43 0.21 -0.01
Minority interests 0.19 0.19 0.14 0.15 0.09
Net income 0.25 0.38 0.29 0.07 -0.10
Quarterly income
2010
Sep. Dec. Mar. Jun. Sep.
Own funds
Original own funds 24 151 25 484 26 011 25 889 24 803
Of which: non-core elements 4 294 4 616 4 595 3 420 2 682
Capital Requirements 21 771 21 694 21 426 21 508 21 437
Core Tier I 7.3 7.7 8.0 8.4 8.3
2010 2011
Year Ending 31 December 2011E 2012E 2011E 2012E 2011E 2012E
Profit & Loss (EUR m)
Net interest revenue 284.573 299.027 283.632 296.242 0% -1%
Non-interest income 240.085 256.462 232.396 247.766 -3% -3%
Commissions 132.338 142.215 132.622 142.778 0% 0%
Trading revenue 65.939 70.722 59.436 62.568 -10% -12%
Other revenue 41.808 43.525 40.338 42.420 -4% -3%
Total revenue 524.658 555.489 516.028 544.008 -2% -2%
Total Operating Costs 310.778 314.492 311.519 314.229 0% 0%
Employee costs 133.778 137.365 184.245 188.020 38% 37%
Other costs 177.000 177.064 125.586 124.538 -29% -30%
Pre-Provision profit 219.830 243.622 210.931 232.120 -4% -5%
Bad debt expense 84.172 68.702 86.186 71.761 2% 4%
Operating Profit 129.708 172.295 118.323 158.018 -9% -8%
Pre-tax associates 4.171 4.629 4.501 4.938 8% 7%
Pre-tax profit 133.879 176.924 122.824 162.956 -8% -8%
Tax 34.660 46.527 30.215 41.750 -13% -10%
Other post tax items -15.203 -14.538 -18.719 -14.916 23% 3%
Stated net profit 84.246 116.089 74.119 106.520 -12% -8%















Appendix 2 - P & L statement of the six major banking groups 
Source: Bank of Portugal 
Note: Quarterly data have been annualised 
Appendix 2 - Own funds adequacy ratio of the six major banking groups 
Source: Bank of Portugal 
Appendix 4 - Aggregated European banks income statement (46 banks under DB coverage, Eur bns) 
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Tier 1 Capital Total Capital
Minimum 4.5 6 8
Conservation buffer 2.5
Minimum plus conservation buffer 7 8.5 10.5
Countercyclical buffer range 0 - 2.5












Appendix 5 - Institution's total return on equity in previous fiscal year 
Source: Mckinsey 
Appendix 3 - European banks: top-line growth 2008-2011 
Source: Deutsche Bank 
Appendix 4 - Calibration of the Capital Framework 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 E 2013 E 2014 E 2015 E 2016 E
ASSETS
Cash and deposits at central banks 2.027 2.192 931 1.090 751 760 768 774 793
Deposits with banks 664 611 558 581 628 638 651 666 682
Financial assets held for trading 3.690 4.459 3.942 3.435 3.751 3.584 3.595 3.610 3.789
Financial assets at fair value through profit or loss 2.162 1.002 1.424 1.964 1.618 1.361 1.493 1.577 1.570
Available for sale financial assets 7.094 8.532 11.775 11.483 9.336 9.298 9.772 9.801 9.924
Loans and advances to banks 4.532 7.998 4.245 3.283 3.420 3.343 3.631 3.808 4.844
Loans and advances to customers 47.049 48.979 50.829 49.043 48.126 45.968 47.223 47.747 48.607
(Provisions) 1.148 1.552 1.777 2.167 2.321 2.216 2.100 1.900 1.737
Gross loans 52.730 58.529 56.852 54.493 53.868 51.527 52.954 53.456 55.188
Held to maturity investments 2.160 2.542 2.459 1.541 2.137 1.984 1.904 1.875 2.052
Financial assets with repurchase agreements 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hedging derivatives 936 455 447 510 501 604 939 950 967
Non-current assets held for sale 148 238 575 1.647 1.647 1.647 1.647 1.647 1.647
Investment properties 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Property and equipment 638 659 809 852 852 852 852 852 852
Intangible assets 124 138 234 230 230 230 230 230 230
Investments in associates 645 794 962 807 1.032 1.032 1.032 1.032 1.032
Current income tax assets 53 21 99 29
Deferred income tax assets 142 188 283 712
Total tax assets 194 209 383 741 371 355 365 369 381
% of loans 0,4% 0,4% 0,7% 1,4% 0,7% 0,7% 0,7% 0,7% 0,7%
Other assets 3.121 3.490 4.083 3.031 3.316 3.172 3.260 3.291 3.398
% of loans 5,9% 6,0% 7,2% 5,6% 6,2% 6,2% 6,2% 6,2% 6,2%
Total assets without extra financial applications 75.187 82.297 83.655 82.405 80.039 77.044 79.463 80.129 82.503
Extra Financial applications 967 4.827 3.635 3.931 3.525
TOTAL ASSETS 75.187 82.297 83.655 80.237 82.016 82.881 84.107 85.070 87.038
LIABILITIES 
Deposits from central banks 4.810 3.818 7.965 10.014 8.022 6.632 5.546 4.118 4.565
Deposits from banks 7.682 6.896 6.381 6.239 6.260 6.588 7.018 7.492 7.995
Due to customers 26.387 25.446 30.819 34.206 37.020 38.306 39.352 39.789 40.506
Total deposits 38.879 36.160 45.165 50.459 51.303 51.527 51.915 51.400 53.065
Financial liabilities held for trading 1.914 1.561 2.088 2.125 1.868 1.766 1.915 1.926 1.947
Other financial liabilities at fair value through profit or loss 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Debt securities issued 24.597 33.101 24.110 18.453 18.805 19.185 19.322 20.484 20.278
Financial liabilities to transferred assets 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hedging derivatives 727 253 229 239 249 257 263 271 275
Non core liabilities held for sale 13 22 5 141 44 42 44 44 45
% of loans 0,02% 0,04% 0,01% 0,26% 0,08% 0,08% 0,08% 0,08% 0,08%
Provisions 131 180 215 190 173 165 170 171 177
% of loans 0,2% 0,3% 0,4% 0,3% 0,3% 0,3% 0,3% 0,3% 0,3%
Current income tax liabilities 90 134 25 45
Deferred income tax liabilities 37 79 116 111
Total tax liabilities 127 213 141 155 153 147 151 152 157
% of loans 0,2% 0,4% 0,2% 0,3% 0,3% 0,3% 0,3% 0,3% 0,3%
Capital instruments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Subordinated debt 2.829 2.639 2.292 961 930 930 930 736 736
Other liabilities 1.316 1.230 1.935 1321 972 911 948 961 1006
% of loans 2,5% 2,1% 3,4% 2,4% 2,6% 2,6% 2,6% 2,6% 2,6%
TOTAL LIABILITIES 70.534 75.358 76.179 74.045 74.497 74.929 75.658 76.145 77.688
SHAREHOLDERS' EQUITY
Share Capital 2.500 3.500 3.500 4.030 5.040 5.040 5.040 5.040 5.040
Share premium 669 1.085 1.085 1.082 1.049 1.049 1.049 1.049 1.049
Other capital instruments 0 0 320 30 30 30 30 30 30
Treasury stock -30 -25 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Preference shares 600 600 600 212 212 212 212 212 212
Fair value reserve -266 301 -10 -1.086 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900
Other reserves and retained earnings 624 672 979 1447 1463 1654 1965 2341 2737
Profit for the period attributable to equity holders of the bank 402 522 511 -109 16 259 445 545 574
Prepaid dividends 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Minority interests 154 284 491 588 609 609 609 609 609
TOTAL EQUITY 4.653 6.939 7.476 6.192 7.518 7.952 8.449 8.925 9.351
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND TOTAL EQUITY 75.187 82.297 83.655 80.237 82.016 82.881 84.107 85.070 87.038
Loans-to-Deposit Ratio (Total) 136% 162% 126% 108% 105% 100% 102% 104% 104%
Loans-to-Deposit Ratio (Customers) 178% 192% 165% 143% 130% 120% 120% 120% 120%
  
Appendix 9 - Maturity of European sovereign exposure 
Source: BES results presentation of 2011 
Appendix 10 - Balance sheet forecast (2012 - 2016) in mn euros 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 E 2013 E 2014 E 2015 E 2016 E
Account Management 89 86 85 81 78 72 80 83 84
% of IEA 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1%
Commissions on Loans 82 109 131 104 99 96 101 102 106
% of IEA 0,1% 0,2% 0,2% 0,2% 0,2% 0,2% 0,2% 0,2% 0,2%
Trade Finance & Exports related 33 54 94 85 63 61 63 64 66
% of IEA 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1%
Corporate Finance and Project Finance 44 55 69 60 51 52 54 55 57
% of IEA 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1%
Guarantees 58 73 92 125 83 80 83 84 87
% of IEA 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,2% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1%
Securities Related Fees 51 53 51 90 92 93 86 87 88
% of IEA 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1%
Asset Management 101 99 102 86 82 87 93 94 97
% of IEA 0,2% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1%
Cards 35 35 40 41 43 44 45 45 46
% of IEA 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1%
Bancassurance 47 61 56 35 33 37 42 42 50
% of IEA 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1%
Factoring 7 8 8 8 7 7 7 8 8
% of IEA 0,01% 0,01% 0,01% 0,01% 0,01% 0,01% 0,01% 0,01% 0,01%
Other 89 86 78 75 76 76 76 77 77
% of IEA 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1%
Total 636 718 807 791 709 704 731 740 765
Interest earning assets 64.598 70.118 71.738 68.405 65.767 63.196 65.613 66.425 68.647
Domestic 500 568 610 600 544 532 557 564 578
Return on fees and commissions 0,8% 0,8% 0,9% 0,9% 0,8% 0,8% 0,8% 0,8% 0,8%
International 136 150 197 190 164 173 174 176 187
Stake # shares Dividend Income (€ mn) Dividend Income (€ mn) Dividend Income (€ mn) Dividend Income (€ mn) Dividend Income (€ mn)
EDP 2,19% 80.110.820 0,185 €               15 0,20 €                  16 0,22 €                  17 0,23 €                  18 0,25 €                  20
PT 10,45% 93.697.989 0,65 €                  61 0,67 €                  63 0,69 €                  65 0,71 €                  67 0,73 €                  69
BMCE 0,25% 429.900 1,5625 €            0,67 1,5625 €            0,67 1,5625 €            0,67 1,5625 €            0,67 1,5625 €            0,67
Total 12,89% 174.238.709 2,40 €                  76 2,43 €                  79 2,47 €                  83 2,50 €                  86 2,54 €                  89
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 E 2013 E 2014 E 2015 E 2016 E
Interest rate, credit & FX 114 132 -28 175 161 151 158 160 162
% of securities portfolio 0,8% 0,8% -0,1% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0%
Equity 114 257 397 93 250 243 253 258 263
Trading 23 168 203 -74 173 163 170 172 174
% of securities portfolio 0,1% 1,0% 1,0% -0,4% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0%
Income from securities 92 89 193 168 76 79 83 86 89
Total of capital markets 229 389 369 269 410 394 411 417 425
Other results -63 142 64 -290 -542 -311 -227 -222 -216
Securities portfolio 15.106 16.535 19.600 18.423 16.900 16.223 16.636 16.781 17.282
Total of capital markets & other results 166 531 433 -22 -132 83 183 196 209
o.w. domestic 103 383 409 -34 -144 63 140 149 159
% of CM & O 62% 72% 94% 156% 109% 76% 76% 76% 76%
o.w. international 62 148 24 12 12 20 43 46 50
% of CM & O 38% 28% 6% -55% -9% 24% 24% 24% 24%
  
Appendix 11 – Fees and commissions forecast (in € mn) 
Source: BES annual reports & own calculations 
Appendix 107 – Income from securities forecast (in € mn) 
Source: BES Financials, Bloomberg, Other company reports & own calculations 
Appendix 96 – Capital markets & other forecast (in € mn) 
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